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ABSTRACT

Multiple fields of study have sought for decades to understand what motivates an
individual to serve in the public sector. Using the prominent theory of public service motivation
(PSM) created by Perry & Wise (1990) and the Institutional-Occupational Model introduced by
Charles Moskos (1977), this study enhances the existing literature on motivation by focusing
more comprehensively on the attitudes, background, and experiences of American veterans. One
hundred and fifty-one American military veterans currently pursuing post-secondary education
were surveyed to determine if public service motivation theory (PSM) and the I-O model explain
veterans’ choices as to enlistment and their willingness to continue careers in the military or
some other form of public service. This research extends the work of Ngaruiya et al. (2014) and
Taylor et al. (2015) by broadening the sample of military personnel to include men and women,
officers and enlisted, non-combat related military occupational specialties, and more ethnic
minorities from every branch and service component of the military. Whereas the previous
studies found a strong, positive relationship between the four dimensions of PSM and Moskos’
Institutional motivations, this research concludes that the relationship appears tenuous, at best.
Instead, student-veterans seem to be motivated to serve for both intrinsic (duty and service to
country) and extrinsic reasons (educational, retirement, and health benefits). More research is
needed, though, to determine if the observed relationship is the rule or the exception.
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CHAPTER I
THE CITIZEN SOLDIER
“The soldier is the Army. No army is better than its soldiers. The Soldier is also a citizen. In fact,
the highest obligation and privilege of citizenship is that of bearing arms for one’s country.”
- George S. Patton Jr.
Section 1.1 Military Service in the United States
In January 2017, Donald Trump took command of the smallest American military since
Congress declared war on Japan, Germany, and Italy in 1941. According to a Department of
Defense’s December 2016 Service report that was released just before his predecessor left office,
just over 1,310,421 men and women were serving on Active Duty in one of the five military
branches, with another 811,732 in the National Guard or Reserves. Although the Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, and Air Force all sought to increase their active duty and reserve end strength two
years later, only the Marine Corps and Air Force were able to meet their projected goals (U.S.
Department of Defense, 2019). The Army met only 91.5% of their active-duty goal of 76,500
new recruits and fell short of their national guard and reserve goals (Myers, 2018). The Trump
Administration proposed adding over 26,000 servicemembers (Shane, 2018) in their 2019
proposed budget, this is still much lower than even pre-9/11, as can be seen by Appendix A. By
the end of 2019, they managed to only increase active-duty personnel to 1,367,030 and National
Guard and Reserve forces to 1,037,904 (Cancian, 2020). Despite attempts to regrow the size of
our military forces, success appears to be out of reach for myriad reasons (Copp, 2019). Such an
issue begs several questions, like what motivates people to join the military? While several
studies have sought to address this question over the last few decades, they have either applied
inefficient theoretical models or lacked enough data to truly analyze the entire population of
those who serve in the Armed Forces. As a result, the current study seeks to expound on previous
studies to provide more clarity on the issue and bring the body of knowledge a few steps closer
1

to knowing the motivations behind military service, as doing so will hopefully provide more
insight into both sustaining and growing our capabilities in the years to come.
Section 1.2 Background of the Study
Military service in the United States is older than the country itself. Throughout our
nation’s history, millions of people have volunteered to support and defend our country from a
range of enemies, both foreign and domestic. However, this call has not always been voluntary,
as the federal government has employed the method of conscription, also known as the draft, in
approximately six conflicts: the American Revolution, the American Civil War, World War I,
World War II, Korean War, and Vietnam. For instance, to increase the Army’s strength as it
prepared to support the Triple Entente during World War I, President Woodrow Wilson signed
into law the Selective Services Act on May 18, 1917 (Pub. L. 65–12, 40 Stat. 76). Consequently,
approximately 2,810,296 men were drafted between September 2017 and November 1918. This
pales in comparison to the 10,110,104 that were drafted between November 1940 and October
1946 to fight in World War II (Selective Service System, n.d.). Far fewer men were drafted for
the wars in Korea and Vietnam and conscription formally ended in January 1973. Since ending
the draft, America has been operating on a global scale with an all-volunteer military. During the
throws of the Cold War, the Department of Defense employed between 2 and 3.5 million men
and women in uniform, and even with a small dip in enlistment numbers during the late 90s, the
Global War on Terror resulted in another spike in numbers as the U.S. engaged in battle in both
Afghanistan and Iraq. Appendix A provides the total number of servicemembers in each military
branch from 1938 to 2016, just before President Trump’s inauguration.
Regarding motivations for joining the public sector, much of the extant literature within
social and behavioral sciences have dealt with the study of individual behavior, particularly those
2

serving in the civil service sector. More specifically, one area of study within Public
Administration deals with the question of why people behave as they do within public
institutions, while another seeks to understand why people join public institutions in the first
place. The prevailing notion holds that people are motivated to work in the public service for
altruistic reasons (i.e., a desire to serve), or a wish to have a long-lasting impact on society.
Altruism is closely associated with the idea of public service ethos, which is rooted in an
understanding that the public service is different from their private sector, both because of the
tasks it performs and the behaviors it expects of its employees. Over the last 30 years, public
administration scholars have sought to understand what motivates individuals to pursue careers
in the public versus private sector. The long-held belief that it takes a certain type of person to
work in government has been heavily debated and several explanations have been put forth
regarding the qualities and attributes that public servants embody, as compared to the private
sector counterparts. In short, individuals who are naturally inclined to think less of self and more
of others (i.e., altruistic) are better suited for a career in the public sector.
Section 1.2.1 Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations
In general, people are motivated to work for and in the public sector for a variety of
different reasons. The term public sector can mean not only governments at all levels but public
corporations (like the Tennessee Valley Authority) and other quasi-public entities that are subject
to control by governments. This sector of employment has traditionally offered several attractive
extrinsic motivators that entice people to forego higher-paying jobs in the private sector, such as
security of tenure, the career perspective, and pension systems (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008).
Despite the number of public administrators that have committed a significant amount of time
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studying such motivations, psychologists have a long history of studying social interaction and
developed theories about extrinsic and intrinsic motivations.
Extrinsic motivations respond to incentives external to the individual's response to the
task itself. Hence, when people are extrinsically motivated, their behavior is motivated by an
external factor pushing them to do something in hopes of earning a reward -- or avoiding a lessthan-positive outcome. In other words, an extrinsically motivated person is likely to pursue a
course of action because there is a tangible reward associated with it. Intrinsic motivations, on
the other hand, are derived from interest and engagement in the actual work involved in the task.
When a person is intrinsically motivated, his or her behavior is motivated by an internal desire to
do something for its own sake. For example, if a person reads a book because he or she wants to
learn about a particular topic or issue, this is considered an intrinsic motivation. Conversely, a
person who reads a book to prepare for a test is extrinsically motivated to read because it could
result in a better performance on the upcoming test. In each instance, there is a reward, with one
of them (success on the test) being obtained externally.
Section 1.2.2. Public vs. Private Institutions
The notion that public institutions operate in a separate and distinct manner from their
private industry counterparts is widely accepted. This is evidenced by the study of public
administration's four pillars – efficiency, effectiveness, economy, and social equity. Whereas
private corporations are concerned with issues of efficiency and economy, public institutions
must also deal with the issue of equity. This consideration serves as the bedrock that separates
public agencies from other organizations, as governments are tasked with ensuring that policies
and programs are carried out equitably. Thus, individuals pursuing careers in public
organizations are likely to be motivated by social equity (Frederickson, 1997).

4

Motivation in public service can be traced back to studies of public institutions. One
prominent theorist that examined American public institutions was Max Weber (1946), who
developed one of the strongest arguments for a public institutional logic in the realm of public
service. Despite being a sociological argument, Weber makes a defense for the distinction
between public and private service. This case for separating public and private service was taken
further by other scholars who claim that public institutions operated according to a different logic
than private industry. Managers in public institutions were intended to pursue a set of democratic
and societal values distinctly different from their counterparts in the private sector (Dahl &
Lindblom, 1953; Lindblom, 1977).
As it relates to the motivations derived from each sector, early studies like Cacioppe &
Mock, (1984), Rainey (1982), Wittmer, (1991), and Crewson (1997) associated the motivations
for pursuing employment in the public sector with intrinsic values like altruism or the desire to
help others, benefit society, or engage in meaningful public service. These studies focused most
of their attention on establishing the existence of public service motivation by showing that
public sector employees are more likely to value intrinsic rewards more and extrinsic or financial
rewards less than their private-sector counterparts (Wright, 2001). Such assumptions were not
being tested within the field of public administration during that time, primarily because there
were few if any real theories that encapsulated the characteristics that compelled people to
choose public service jobs over others. This began to change with the introduction of public
service motivation theory (PSM), an approach posited by Perry & Wise (1990). Since its
inception, PSM has become one of the most prominent theories used within the field of public
administration to understand why people are attracted to the public sector. Prior to the creation of
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PSM, it was a theory developed within the field of sociology that served as the primary means of
examining military service.
Section 1.3 Problem Statement
The study of public service motivation theory has increased substantially over the last
three decades. Even so, the most understudied area of public service has been the military.
Scholars in America and abroad have spent countless hours surveying civil service employees
from a range of local, state, federal, and international agencies. Yet only a handful of studies
have been conducted to discern whether motivations for joining the military mimic those found
among civil service employees. The problem with previous research is that it neglects the largest
federal employer, the U.S. Department of Defense. This study helps rectify this problem by
surveying the background, service experience, and motivations U.S. military personnel within
the veteran community pursuing higher education degrees. Doing so will add to the knowledge
for understanding why individuals answer the call to serve their country in uniform.
Section 1.4 Purpose of This Study
The American military, as a public institution, is not static. It changes with the times,
mainly because the people that make up this institution tend to change over time. Addressing this
reality requires much time and attention. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of this type of research
currently being performed and this study has the potential to address important issues pertaining
to military service levels and, to a larger extent, the public sector. Enhancing our knowledge base
of public service motivation, which this study does, has the potential to address multiple
concerns within the national security community. First, it uncovers generational differences that
need to be controlled for in both recruitment and retention of quality servicemembers. Second, it
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enables leaders to better understand how military forces can be used to fight the wars of the
future and not just the present. In short, identifying our greatest weaknesses as a country and
learning more about the people who could help overcome those weaknesses is an essential task
for our governmental leaders today and such a task requires more research like this one.
This study answers questions for both academics and practitioners by examining current
servicemembers from each military branch and component within the Department of Defense
through the lens of public service motivation theory to determine if motivations for joining the
military mirror those of their civilian counterparts. By looking at previous studies, I make the
case that public service motivation theory (PSM) provides the most succinct explanation for why
people join the military, as compared to another theoretical model that has been used in the past.
For instance, prior to PSM, a prominent theory used to examine military motivations was the
Institutional-Occupational (I-O) model created by sociologist Charles Moskos (1971). I include
the tenets of both the I-O Model and PSM to determine which theory holds more explanatory
power for determining why individuals choose to serve in the military. By surveying individuals
with military service that are currently pursuing a post-secondary education, I will be able to
capture data from individuals that are currently serving in the military – whether on active duty
or in the National Guard or Reserves – as well as those who are no longer serving but are
currently pursuing a degree program. Observing the latter group also sheds light on what career
pathways veterans are pursuing upon completion of their military service. This research expands
the body of knowledge seeking to answer this question by looking at a broader segment of the
military population, both past and present.
This is accomplished by first examining relevant literature as it relates to military service
motivations. This includes a thorough examination of Moskos’ I-O model, as well as a historical
7

review of previous research performed using PSM theory within the American civil service
community. Next, I focus on two exploratory studies conducted by a group of authors that
created a survey instrument combining the I-O and PSM models. Their first work compared
undergraduate students and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadets at the University of
Toledo, Ohio (2014), while their second study observed 174 Special Forces soldiers in the Army
(2015). Both studies will serve as the point of departure for my examination because their
observed populations are like the ones being used in this study. Answering their call for further
research, I extend the work of Ngaruiya et al. (2014) and Taylor et al. (2015), by adopting the
items in their survey instrument, which is a modified version of the instrument created by Kim et
al. (2013). Because my study observes a broader swath of the military population than Taylor et
al., I added additional demographic questions to account for this diversity. More specifically, I
included questions that considered gender, age, and military occupational specialties. Since
Ngaruiya et al. looked at individuals who were not officially in the military at the time of their
study, I considered additional questions that account for length of service and the number of
deployments they went on. Next, I examine the data collected through the surveys using the
same statistical analyses as the previous studies and compare my results to those found by each
study. In doing so, I provide an assessment of the explanatory power that both I-O and PSM
theories have in explaining why people join the United States military.
Section 1.5 Theoretical Framework
Section 1.5.1 Institutional/Occupational Model
The first major attempt at explaining why people join the military was undertaken by a
veteran turned sociologist Charles Moskos. Moskos’ earliest works focused on observing why
people decided to join an all-voluntary military. Moskos, who was drafted into the Army upon
8

graduating from Princeton University in 1956, spent two years as a combat engineer and
developed a strong affinity for studying men and women in the military. In 1977, he developed a
theoretical model for explaining why people joined the military in a post-conscription America.
Moskos argued that an all-volunteer military would consist of people who were attracted to the
occupational benefits, as opposed to the institutional values that each branch espoused. In other
words, people would likely join the military for more self-interested reasons instead of
“following a calling” (1977, 42). This approach suggests a more market-based view of military
service, in which individuals will be motivated to serve out of personal gain instead of viewing
military service as a commitment to the public good. Moskos later expounded on his previous
theoretical framework by providing greater specificity to the I-O variables that distinguished
these service motivations (Moskos, 1986).
Several empirical sociological studies have explored the merit of I-O within the military.
Griffith found that institutional values still played a prominent role in explaining why reservists
are likely to reenlist, as compared to those who were more occupationally motivated (Griffith,
2008). Another study found that institutional values were of central importance to
servicemembers that enlisted on active duty (Woodruff, Kelty, & Segal, 2006). Mastroianni
found that Marine Corps officers are less occupationally motivated than their counterparts in the
other branches. These findings appear to run counter to the suppositions posited by Moskos, yet
several other studies have concluded a healthy mix of both institutional and occupational
motivations embedded in the servicemembers that were observed (Stahl, Manley, & McNichols,
1981; Segal, 1986; Eighmey, 2006; Woodruff, Kelty, and Segal, 2006; Griffith, 2008). In sum, IO has been seen as a useful analytical tool for observing individual motivations for enlistment
and retention in the military, even with evidence of its limitations.

9

Section 1.5.2 Public Service Motivation Theory
As the I-O model was attaining prominence within scholarly research, another prominent
motivation theory was being developed by public administration scholars. Public Service
Motivation theory was originally coined by Perry and Wise in their study of the motivational
bases of Public Service (1990), as distinguished from those who pursue careers in the private
sector. The authors argued that public service motivation is driven by a desire to serve the public
interest by way of engaging in the policy process. Moreover, such individuals are likely to have
higher levels of loyalty to civic duty than their private-sector peers. Finally, social equity and the
“benevolence of patriotism” will serve as principles within which they will seek the common
good. In short, Perry and Wise asserted that people who pursue public service careers are more
concerned with the general well-being of their society than profit margins. For the last 30 years,
this theory has been empirically tested by many scholars in a variety of settings. Thus, they
compared public and private sector workers (Brewer & Selden, 1998; Houston, 2000), as well as
nonprofit workers and volunteers (Houston, 2006; Perry, Coursey, Brudney, & Littlepage, 2008).
Taken as a whole, the I-O model appears useful in explaining differences between employees in
the public and private sectors, as well as similarities found between public and nonprofit
workers. Some studies found that higher levels of public service motivation among employees
are associated with higher retention in public service organizations (Crewson, 1997; Naff &
Crum, 1999; Steijn, 2008). Public service motivation does not fully explain why people are
motivated to pursue careers in the public sector. Instead, research that indicates public service
motivation is a multidimensional construct that significantly helps explain the non-financial
reasons people pursue a public service calling; in much the same way as Moskos’ I-O model
indicates.
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Despite PSM’s popular usage in observing employees in several public organizations,
one field of public service that has received relatively little attention is the military. Since its rise
to prominence, only one empirical study has sought to observe PSM theory in the context of
military service. Taylor et al. designed a survey instrument that incorporated a Likert-type scale
of institutional-occupational questions adapted from the work of Woodruff, Kelty, and Segal
(2006) with the 20 item PSM instrument that was developed by Kim (2011) and study of Korean
firefighters to survey 174 Army Special Forces soldiers in 2011. They found that PSM appears to
have similar, if not more, explanatory power than I-O in observing this small population of
servicemembers. Like much of the extant literature, they theorized that each of the four
dimensions of PSM would be positively correlated with the institutional motivators and
negatively correlated with occupational motivators and that PSM would be positively related to
motivations to reenlist in the military (p. 147). Although the Taylor et al. study provided a
unique lens through which to view PSM within the context of the military, the authors
acknowledged that much more can and should be done to determine if their findings can be
generalized to the entire population of servicemembers. Here is where this study seeks to add to
the existing literature of public administration and military studies.
Section 1.5.3 Theoretical Limitations
Studies on public service motivation theory have provided a wealth of information on the
motivations of individuals within the public sphere. Even so, the theory is not without
limitations. As with any social or behavioral theory, PSM has thus far been unable to provide full
and complete explanatory power for why individuals act in certain ways. For instance, Bozeman
and Su (2014) make a series of charges against PSM, particularly how the theory has been
employed as an independent variable throughout much of the studies of the last two decades. The
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authors acknowledge that this is in large part due to its relative youth, as compared to other
theories of motivation; yet the explosion of PSM literature over the last decade necessitates more
emphasis on PSM as a dependent variable. Second, only limited progress has been made in
providing an adequate set of explanations or hypotheses about how the theory develops and why
some people are prone to have more of it than others. Third, PSM literature has been inconsistent
concerning how it views intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. PSM scholars are prone to implicitly
assume, or explicitly declare, that PSM personifies intrinsic motivation; however, more recent
scholars have tended to downplay the ties between the two, choosing instead to place a great
emphasis on its relevance to the study of institutions (p. 705-706). In either case, these studies
send an inconsistent message as to what contribution PSM can make to the study of service
motivation (or institutions).
Empirical observations continue to confirm that its multidimensional construct helps
explain the non-financial reasons why people are apt to pursue a public service calling. On the
other hand, the theory struggles to explain the financially related reasons why people might
pursue careers in the public sector. An increasingly diverse implementation of measurement
instruments is needed to clarify the theory's conceptual boundaries and determine its relationship
to other important variables. (Ritz, Brewer, & Neumann, 2016). Finally, students of PSM often
misconstrue the theory as a purely altruistic concept. What they fail to account for is that
individuals often perform meaningful public service for rational, self-interested, or instrumental
reasons when their self-interests are aligned with the public interests (Perry, Hondeghem, &
Wise 2010). Even with these limitations, the theory has proven to be a valuable tool for
understanding motivation in the public context.
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Section 1.6 Research Questions and Hypotheses
I extend the research conducted by Ngaruiya et al. (2014) and Taylor et al. (2015) by
creating a series of similar research questions and hypotheses, while also accounting for the
differences in our observed populations. Whereas Ngaruiya et al. looked at ROTC Cadets and
Taylor et al. examined active-duty Special Forces soldiers, this study surveys a broader
compilation of servicemembers. Since both studies found that PSM was positively correlated
with the institutional motivators found in the I-O model, I expect that an expanded survey sample
of the student-veterans would produce similar findings. Therefore, I adopt a similar set of
hypotheses for my study. I expect to find a positive correlation between all four dimensions of
PSM and Institutional motivation, as determined by Taylor et al. in Hypothesis 1 (p. 147).
Additionally, I expect that student-veterans will also have higher levels of commitment to public
values than the undergraduates surveyed by Ngaruiya et al. (p. 446). Because the present study
includes a greater level of diversity among its respondents, I did not expect to find the same
results as the two previous studies. Rather, by including both men and women, as well as people
with different military occupational specialties in both the active and reserve components, I
expected the results to produce significant variation among groups on the Self-Sacrifice
dimension. I also expected a larger and more diverse sample size to produce a positive
correlation with both the Commitment to Public Value and Compassion dimensions because my
sample included individuals whose primary jobs were not relegated to undergraduate students
with no formal military service or those serving in just one branch of the military. The only
major distinction between my hypotheses and that of Taylor et al. concerns the dependent
variable. In the Taylor et al. study, they were seeking to determine the likelihood of reenlistment
of their participants. Since my observed population includes individuals that have already left the
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military, my dependent variable will focus on the likelihood of continued service in the public
sector. In other words, are veterans more likely to continue serving in the public sector even after
they leave the military? What is more, do some of the tangible benefits associated with military
service (i.e., educational benefits) entice veterans to pursue post-secondary degrees that will lead
to a public service career on the civilian side, or possibly improve their existing military careers
upon completion? Answering these types of questions could enhance our understanding of the
extent to which an individual’s propensity to join the military could motivate them to continue
serving the public in a civilian capacity.
Section 1.7 Research Design, Data, and Methods
Section 1.7.1 Survey Instrument
In March of 2019, I contacted Dr. Jami Taylor, Professor of Political Science at the
University of Toledo. She served as the primary author of the study including active-duty Special
Forces Soldiers stationed at Bragg, NC, as well as a co-author of the study at her home
institution. Through our correspondence, I obtained a copy of the survey instrument used in both
studies, with the instrument from their study of active-duty Army personnel serving as the
foundation for this research. Just as the previous study used reenlistment as the dependent
variable, I too used it in my study. By using the same PSM dimensions as my independent
variables, I expected that my findings would shed light, not only on the ability to retain current
servicemembers, but also on how to recruit new ones. It is also important to note that I expanded
my survey to include more common demographic variables to account for the wider range of
respondents. For instance, in Taylor et al.’s study, all 174 individuals were men, whereas I
include women serving from multiple branches of the military. Women are an important
demographic within the Army, primarily because in FY 2018 females made up 14.8 percent of
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the active-duty force, 23.5 percent in the Reserve component, and 17.2 percent in the National
Guard (DoD, 2019). Furthermore, while the previous study only surveyed active-duty personnel,
I include those serving in all three components. By increasing the demographic questions, I
enhance the body of knowledge that studies motivations for the entire military. Finally,
expanding the sample size allowed surveying service members in other military occupational
specialties (MOS) and officer branches from all branches of the military. Even though this study
was unable to sufficiently survey members from every MOS in each military branch, it still
makes a worthy contribution to the body of knowledge by including a broader segment of the
military occupational specialties. Because the population being observed is so diverse, the
likelihood of obtaining responses from veterans and servicemembers within each military
branch’s MOS category is higher than the collection methods used in other studies.
Taylor et al. did not extend their analysis to include crucial demographic and background
characteristics for those they studied. The survey instrument used in this study remedies this by
gathering background and demographic information, such as age, race, ethnicity, geographic
location, family service histories, citizenship, and partisan affiliation. Including this information
should produce a more comprehensive understanding of the people who serve in the military, as
well as their motivation for continuing (or ceasing) to do so. Including background and
demographic information should also shed more light on how certain individual and group
attributes affect public service in America. For instance, there are still some gaps in the literature
regarding the role gender or race plays in motivating public service. Or, for example, does
partisan affiliation or family history affect one’s motivation for public service? The present study
potentially sheds light on these issues and may provide a richer understanding of public service
needed better to advance motivation theory.
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Section 1.7.2 Theoretical and Methodological Limitations of the Study
This study is subject to theoretical and methodological limitations that are apparent in
previous research on motivational theory. In this section, these limitations are addressed. There
are several hundred thousand student-veterans currently attending colleges and universities
around the country. It is unlikely that a single theory and research approach can fully encompass
the background, experience, and motivations of all who enter the military and public service.
Ideally, such research should be longitudinal and national in its scope to account for generational
and intergenerational differences and changes. The cost of such research is far beyond the
resources available for this study. A single, national time-bound probability sample of
servicemembers in the Armed Forces is also prohibitively expensive. In this study, a more
focused but less generalizable approach was required. Surveying veterans enrolled at US
colleges and universities in 2021 limits the scope of this research but allows for further testing of
the public service model and motivation setting. This research is limit as well by the usual
problems associated with survey methodology. Many scholars have addressed the problems
inherent in survey methodology (Goyder, 1986; Feilzer, 2010; Simon & Goes, 2011) and point to
potentialities like dishonesty, unanswered questions, hidden agendas, unconscientious responses,
etc. Despite these possible shortcomings, PSM theory and survey methodology remain the best
option available within the resources and time available for this study.
Section 1.7.3 Data Collection and Method of Analysis
Data for this study were collected from 151 student-veterans enrolled at 12 separate
community colleges and universities from seven different states: California, Indiana, Illinois,
New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, and Texas. Representatives working directly with veterans
enrolled at their respective institutions contacted student-veterans and asked them to participate
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in the study. All responses were confidential, and this author had no direct contact with any of
the respondents. Surveys were completed by students between June 22 and September 25, 2021.
Due to certain institutional restrictions related to the COVID-19 Pandemic, all responses were
collected digitally. Each student was given the link to an online version of the survey to
complete. Responses came from student-veterans pursuing 2-year associate degrees, 4-year
bachelor’s degrees, and multiple postgraduate degree programs. Males and females from both the
officer and enlisted ranks within each of the four military branches within the Department of
Defense completed the survey. There were also as many different military occupational
specialties as there were respondents. Finally, despite data being collected from institutions
within only seven states, these student-veterans are residents from over 30 different states.
As to data analysis methods, Ngaruiya et al. (2014) and Taylor et al. (2015) used Pearson
correlations to test their hypotheses and sub-hypotheses regarding the relationships between
PSM dimensions and I-O motivators among the two different populations they surveyed. To
mimic their study, I adopt the same analytic methods. I use multinomial logistic regressions to
determine if PSM dimensions or the I-O model helps explain motivations for continuing their
service in the public sector. This is an important distinction from the Taylor et al. study, as they
examined only the intent to reenlist. The present study adds to the broader body of literature
looking at motivations by surveying individuals pursuing post-secondary education and many of
them are no longer in the military. By observing veterans upon completion of their military
service obligation, I provide an additional perspective of the military population and their views
on public service as a career. Ngaruiya et al. surveyed individuals prior to their military service.
Taylor et al. surveyed individuals during their service. This study adds builds upon and extends
their research by focusing on individuals following their military service so as determine if their
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motivations for joining the military carry over into potential careers on the civilian side of the
public sector.
Section 1.8 Conclusion
This study seeks to provide a greater examination of the motivations that individuals have
for joining the military, as well as why they would or would not continue to serve within the
public sector. Where previous studies have examined these issues, they have either used
inefficient theoretical models or they have obtained too narrow of a sample size to accurately
assess the entire population. This study adds to this body of literature by enhancing the
understanding of who joins the military and why. As previously stated, the American military
makes up a significant percentage of the federal workforce; therefore, a closer examination of the
population is both warranted and overdue. Outside of those in the First Responder community,
no other profession takes more risks than those who go into harm’s way. Understanding what
compels them to do it is necessary and important, both as scholars and as citizens.
Finally, as someone who currently serves in the military, I believe this study will help me
better understand the people I am currently serving alongside, as well as those who will serve in
the future. It will also be of benefit to the entire U.S. Armed Forces, as they continue to develop
new and different strategies for recruiting and retaining men and women to serve in various
capacities. Presidential administrations on both sides of the political spectrum have advocated for
a strong and healthy military for combating the various forces that seek to harm the United
States. Understanding the motivations of those who serve is necessary and important to ensure
we can guard against all our enemies.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
“Public service must be more than doing a job efficiently and honestly. It must be a complete
dedication to the people and to the nation.”
- Margaret Chase Smith
Section 2.1 Public Service as a Field of Study
Although public service is an age-old profession, understanding one’s motivations for
choosing to serve in the public versus private sector is a relatively new academic venture.
Throughout much of the study of Public Administration, the primary focus was on how
individuals performed within the public sector, not their reasons for joining. Even more,
understanding what motivates people to join the military, arguably the most life-threatening form
of public service, is difficult to determine. Researchers operated on the assumption that public
servants were just more patriotic, benevolent, altruistic, or compassionate than those in the
private sector. Despite the merits of these assumptions, there is insufficient evidence to explain
how and why individuals possess these characteristics. This chapter provides a summary of the
major theories posited throughout the 20th century that, while providing some insight into this
form of behavior, were still unable to address why people chose to join a public organization
instead of a private one. Second, I examine the ways that the I-O model has been used in the
public sector generally, as well as in the military. Next, I will provide an in-depth look at how
PSM was developed by Perry and Wise (1990) and how it has been used over the last 30 years to
understand public sector motivations. Just as no theory is perfect at explaining the world around
us, I provide a summary of the major shortcomings of the specified theory and how it impacts the
current study of public service motivation among current servicemembers and veterans. In doing
so, I establish a baseline for determining where my findings add to the extant literature on
motivation theories within the study of public sector employment.
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Section 2.1.1 Brief History of Public Service in the United States
The common practice of rewarding political loyalty with governmental jobs served as the
means through which government agencies were staffed and led (Wilson, 1975). To maximize
the efficacy of the administrative state, public administration theory began with the notion that
politics was separate and distinct from politics. This theory held that if certain political factors
were removed from the administrative function of government, it would become more effective
and provide greater efficiency. Woodrow Wilson (1887), Frank Goodnow (1900), and Luther
Gulick (1937) are credited with being the forefathers of Politics/Administration Dichotomy and
others expounded on their work to present an idealized public bureaucracy that is both
uncorrupted by politics and filled with expert administrators (Frederickson & Smith, 2003).
Despite a professional bureaucracy being advocated by both scholars and practitioners
throughout the first half of the 20th century, writers like Herring (1936) and Levitan (1943) aptly
warned that an increasingly powerful administrative state with unchecked discretion could pose a
grave threat to democracy. Both authors were writing during a period when the byproduct of the
New Deal was an expansive and more powerful bureaucracy. They advocated that a democratic
philosophy with democratic principles must permeate throughout democratic states for public
agencies to democratically administrate. Restated, “Administration must have a soul” (Levitan,
1943, 359). Despite the need for more technical expertise and professionalism within the
executive branch, it must still be held accountable to the people vis-à-vis elected officials. The
perception during this time was that the federal branches of government were largely
unconcerned with the bureaucracy and this lack of oversight allowed agencies to run rampant
(Waterman, Rouse, & Wright, 2004). In sum, the American bureaucracy needed some internal
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accountability, and establishing a public-service minded profession could provide adequate
safeguards against corruption and impropriety.

Section 2.1.2 Motivation Theories in Behavioral Sciences
At roughly the same time that public administration was going through the process of
examining human behavior within public organizations, other social science disciplines within
the field of social sciences struggled with their understanding of self-interest. For instance,
psychologist deCharms (1968) developed the intrinsic versus extrinsic motivational model
mentioned in the previous chapter at roughly the same time that many public administration
scholars like Niskanen were dealing with the issues of utility maximization in the public domain.
However, these scholars focused primarily on individual motivations for making these types of
career decisions. This is what Steer & Porter (1991) refer to as work motivation, or the process
by which behavior is energized, directed and sustained in organizational settings. For instance,
building on the work of deCharms, other studies in psychology looked at internal causality vs.
external causality for making decisions and discovered that individuals can be motivated to
perform certain acts because of the challenges they present, regardless of any external reward
they might receive (Deci, 1975; Katz & Kahn, 1978). More specifically, Katz & Kahn broke
motivations down into three categories: legal compliance, external rewards, and internal
motivations. Whereas the first two are motivations induced by external forces, the authors broke
down internal motivations into two subcategories: self-expression and internalized values. The
former was derived solely from work performance, with the latter being the result of a group or
an organization’s goal becoming incorporated into the value system of the individual. Simply
put, an individual may perform his or her job well for the purpose of not getting fired (legal
compliance) or earning a raise/bonus (external rewards); but they could also perform well at their
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work primarily because of the stimulation it provides them (self-expression) and/or their work
furthers the mission of the organization (internalized values). As Deci (1975) pointed out, the
reward for performing is simply the satisfaction of knowing they could complete the task. Again,
these types of motivation could be found in either sector of employment; but it still did not
sufficiently address one rationale for going into public service.
Within the field of sociology, Amitai Etzioni (1975) added to the study of human
behavior by categorizing three ways that organizations can induce involvement from their
members. The first two, alienative and calculative are motivation induced by external forces,
much like the legal compliance and external rewards concepts posited by Katz & Kahn. The third
category, moral involvement, takes a more difficult and complex approach to explain internal
motivations. According to Etzioni, moral involvement is subdivided into either pure or social
motivations. Pure motivations are the result of the internalization of norms, with social
involvement resulting from sensitivity to pressures of primary groups and their members. Unlike
the preceding theories, moral involvement is not based on expected satisfaction of needs, such as
self-expression, and may even demand the denial of need satisfaction and the sacrifice of
personal pleasure. This distinction is relevant to the topic at hand because Etzioni used military
service as an example of his concept of moral involvement. In short, military personnel who
serve in the armed forces are demonstrating the value of serving one's country to the point of
risking their lives and this falls outside the bounds of intrinsic motivation because they are going
against both self-interest (in this case self-preservation) and self-expression. In these instances,
the consequence of acting in line with one's internalized values is not based on a pursuit of
pleasure or fulfilling a specific need; rather, it is affirming his or her moral commitments or
espoused values through external means.
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To broadly categorize the work of these authors, Leonard, Beauvais, & Scholl (1999)
suggested that motivation can come in the form of three sources: intrinsic process motivation,
based on goal internalization, and extrinsic or instrumental motivation. Individuals can be
motivated by the first when they perform an act simply because it is “fun.” Second, behavior is
motivated by goal internalization when an individual adopts certain attitudes and behaviors
because they are congruent with the value system they espouse. Finally, extrinsic motivation is
that which is induced by external forces. Regardless of the terminology used, each theory
suggests an external causality for human behavior. Similarly, (Shamir, 1990) asserted that in
each case, the focus on extrinsic motivation assumes that individuals are "rational maximizer(s)
of personal utility" (p. 39). This statement falls in line with the prominent theories in public
administration dealing with individual motivations. However, these theories are still limited in
that they cannot account for the full range of motivated behavior. This has led some researchers
to explore personality theory to better understand behavior that cannot be explained by
existential forces, such as one’s environment or personal situation.
Section 2.2 Civil-Military Relations & Motivation Theory
As it pertains to the modern study of military service, three works are viewed as seminal
writings and all three were contemporaneous to the studies discussed above. Despite his focus on
the role of civil-military relations in America, Samuel Huntington (1957) sought to enhance
clarity and definition to the military officer corps as a public service profession. In doing so, he
argued for a specific esprit de corps found within this area of public service that was unique and
different from other professions. The primary thesis of The Soldier and the State is that the
professionalization of the officer corps is the main component of a secure solution to ensuring
effective civilian control of the armed forces and ensuring adequate national defense. By
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observing this relationship Huntington exposed certain attributes that were present among the
officer corps that helped explain what motivated individuals to pursue this profession. By
introducing the idea of the military as a “profession,” Huntington clarified how the military, as a
public organization, is subordinate to civilian leadership just like every other department or
agency within the federal government. His observations of the military were based on a
constructed professionalism built upon three primary characteristics of expertise, responsibility,
and esprit de corps. The latter term Huntington defines as the outgrowth of “a shared sense of
organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen” (p. 10). The
commonalities among officers, as separate from their subordinates, is what gives them a sense of
unity and purpose in their work. One of the major problems with this assumption, according to
Sorenson (1994), is that it remained an untested assumption.
According to Huntington, the esprit de corps sentiment is a once-for-all given, and comes
fully developed, as opposed to developing over time; his concept of the profession is that it is
constant and unchanging. Huntington distinguished between two general types of professions
that can be found in society, the “bureaucratic” (found among diplomats, officers, and teachers)
and the “associational” or client-oriented (e.g., self-employed lawyers and physicians). Both
were separate and distinct from one another, with overlap still possible. This did not line up with
one of Huntington’s contemporaries: Morris Janowitz. Both men agreed on the overall concept
of esprit de corps, except their views diverged on its employment according to Janowitz’s
publication of The Professional Soldier (1960). As previously stated, Huntington assumed this
characteristic was almost always present among officers – as if it were an inherent trait that made
them suitable for the military profession – while Janowitz argued that the trait (which he referred
to as “corporateness”) was the result of societal forces influencing them throughout their
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maturation into adulthood. In other words, esprit de corps was a learned trait and not something
they inherited at birth. This distinction exists within the context of their writings because
Huntington held that to preserve the military’s esprit de corps, it must be isolated from civilian
influences and interference. He was not arguing that civilians should have no control over
military institutions, though he did believe that aspects of the “civilian” life should be kept out of
how the military runs its day-to-day operations. Where overlap between military and civilian
institutions was inevitable, their ability to influence one another should be minimal. Janowitz, on
the other hand, believed that unification between the two was unavoidable. At some point, the
military was going to have to adopt certain practices inherent in civilian institutions to ensure
they functioned properly. Janowitz also argued that in much the same way that individuals
developed an esprit de corps through societal influences, they were equally as likely to develop
certain attributes and characteristics mostly found in the civil realm and these influences were
likely to penetrate the military establishment over time. Janowitz believed that military
organizations could not be completely separated from civil society because there was a symbiotic
relationship between the two worlds. As a sociologist, Janowitz acknowledged that a wall could
not be built between the two realms (in much the same way that Simon and Waldo argued
against the P/A dichotomy) because their interaction was inevitable. Instead of fighting to keep
them separate and distinct (the divergent model that Huntington espoused), a convergent model
should be accepted to account for the inevitable interaction (and supremacy) that “civilianism”
has within the public sector. In short, the military had to embrace some of the characteristics
found in the civilian sector it was to be considered a true profession.
The third major participant in this scholarly debate was Charles Moskos. Much like
Huntington and Janowitz, Moskos was a veteran of the U.S. Army, and his military service had a
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profound impact on his academic pursuits. His contribution to the topic of civil-military relations
consisted of looking more specifically at enlisted personnel, not just officers as Huntington had
done. Moskos was drafted into the Army and served in the enlisted ranks as a combat engineer
shortly after graduating from Princeton University. In 1970, Moskos published The American
Enlisted Man, which was considered the first comprehensive examination of the rank and file in
the American military since the end of World War II. Like Janowitz, Moskos saw the
convergence, as well as the different characteristics, between armed forces and society. Most of
his writings focused on the various subgroups found within the enlisted population and the
sociological implications of diverse groups of individuals being required to work together
regularly. Moskos also asserted that the military will not be immune to the changes taking place
within American society. Consequently, they would inevitably adopt a convergence model
espoused by Janowitz.
Despite their similarities, Janowitz and Moskos had two distinct viewpoints on both the
cause and effects of the migration from a separate and distinct military profession to one that is
heavily influenced by the civilian sector. On the other hand, Moskos believed the U.S. military
was facing a serious problem that would push it to the limits of its functional capabilities,
especially when the federal government ended conscription and sought to build an all-volunteer
military. For the military to maintain the ability to fulfill its reason for existence, it had to be
more accepting of the established norms and practices of its civilian counterparts. In sum, the
military needed to view itself more as just another type of profession (or occupation), rather than
a separate and distinct institution to which people commit themselves fully and completely. Only
then could it be viewed as part of the public sector.
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Section 2.3 Moskos’ Institutional-Occupational Model
Upon studying the American military in greater detail, Moskos published “From
Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization” in 1977. This was another seminal
writing in the study of civil-military relations; yet its most significant contribution to the study at
hand came in the form of addressing motivations for joining the service. Huntington
acknowledged an esprit de corps among the officer ranks in his observations of the military,
except he spent almost no effort in addressing where this sense of comradery or commitment to
the organization comes from. Janowitz did not even mention how societal forces can instill the
same desires within an individual to motivate them to join the service. So, with the introduction
of the Institutional-Occupational model, Moskos provided a glimpse of the motivations
underlying a person’s willingness to join the military.
Moskos stated that the military can be understood as a social organization just like those
found within a society, with its uniqueness has traditionally been found in its ability to stave off
many societal trends through its adherence to certain institutional values. Traits like order,
discipline, compliance, and uniformity are bedrocks that make a military institution successful;
therefore, the military has historically been given license to ignore or counter any societal trends
that may compromise these attributes. Nevertheless, when a society begins to place a higher
value on other traits and they become generally accepted norms, the military must be willing to
adapt to the new environment or risk extinction. Much like the market-based assumptions of
supply and demand, the military was fighting against other sectors of employment for resources
and manpower, especially with the end of conscription in 1973. No longer could the military
draft young men into service for their country; instead, they had to appeal to the individual’s
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sense of honor, duty, and love of country. Yet, according to Moskos, there needed to be more
incentives for the individual to make such a sacrifice.
Moskos distinguished between institutions and occupations. The former is legitimized by
values and norms that transcend individual self-interest in favor of the greater good, while the
latter, in terms of market-based values of monetary rewards for the individual performing the
service. The occupational model favored self-interest over the needs of the organization, which
was anathema to the history and traditions found in the military. It is worth noting here that much
of what Moskos was suggesting strongly correlated with the work of his contemporaries in
public administration during this period, including Tullock, Downs, and Nisksanen. None of
these scholarly writings occurred in a vacuum. Both the end of the Vietnam War and the
resignation of Richard Nixon took place between Moskos’ The American Enlisted Man and
“From Institution to Occupation.” Furthermore, according to the Pew Research Center’s “Public
Trust in Government'' survey (2019), between October 1972 and December 1974, trust in
government dropped from 53% to 36% and it had fallen to 32% by the time Moskos published
his new I-O model in 1977. Taking these issues into consideration, Moskos argued that the
American military (a government institution) was already beginning to consider the onceneglected societal trends that promoted individual self-interest over institutional values and
norms. Moskos pointed out that as early as 1967, military pay had been linked to the civil
service, which was indirectly linked to the civilian labor market, and both military compensation
and recruitment pay were exponentially higher than their civilian counterparts (p. 44). By
appealing to the benefits found within the military occupation, they could still attract quality
servicemembers and maintain the current standards. For example, Moskos addressed the give
and take relationship between the institution of the military and its occupational benefits:
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Military service traditionally has had many institutional features. One thinks of the
extended tours abroad, the fixed terms of enlistment, liability for 24-hour service
availability, frequent movements of self and family, subjection to military discipline and
law, and inability to resign, strike, or negotiate over working conditions. All this is above
and beyond the dangers inherent in military maneuvers and actual combat operations. It is
also significant that a paternalistic remuneration system has evolved in the military
corresponding to the institutional model: compensation received in noncash form (e.g.,
food, housing, uniforms), subsidized consumer facilities on the base, payments to service
members partly determined by family status, and a large proportion of compensation
received as deferred pay in the form of retirement benefits (p. 42-43).

Moskos drew attention to the sacrifice servicemembers are required to make for the greater good
or the institution (and the country). At the same time, he pointed to tangible ways they can be
rewarded (or compensated) for their actions. As can be seen by the above statement, Moskos
pointed to the individual interests of military personnel in exchange for their compliance with the
unique mission of military endeavors. Table 2.1 (Appendix B) provides a summary of the
differences between the Institutional and Occupational concepts that Moskos developed. There
are two consequences of migrating to the occupational model that Moskos predicted in his
writing, one that appears to have stood the test one time and one that has not. In much the same
way that occupations had organized themselves in the form of unions to both protect and
preserve their trade, Moskos alluded to a growing likelihood of unionization in the military. Very
few attempts to unionize the military have been made and none of them were anywhere close to
being recognized by the military. Moskos acknowledge various obstacles that unions would have
to overcome before being recognized and believed that over time they would succeed. It is worth
mentioning that a multitude of advocacy groups and fraternal organizations have been created
since the time of his writing to address many of the needs of servicemembers. These types of
organizations appear to fill some of the voids that unions likely would have provided, were they
in existence during the time of his writings.
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The second prediction Moskos made regards the use of civilian technicians to perform
specific tasks within the military establishment. Rather than relying on the long and arduous
process of developing technical experts within the ranks of the military, each branch has
continued to hire civilians for certain operational needs. During the 20 years after Moskos
published his article in 1977, the Department of Defense reduced its civilian employment by
only 25%, which is 6% higher than the reduction of active-duty forces during the same period
(DoD, 1997). Furthermore, the increase in military forces after 9/11 was met with a similar
increase in civilian technicians working for each of the branches of service. When American
forces invaded Iraq in 2003, the total number of military personnel – to include active duty,
reserve, and national guard – was 2,312,522. At that same point in time, the total number of
civilians employed by the Department of Defense was 2,412,398 (DoD, 2003). This validates the
claim made by Moskos that the military would continue to rely on the expertise of civilians to
manage some of the non-combat-related aspects of the military institution.
Taken as a whole, Moskos (1977) argued the institutional model that has guided the
military for much of its existence will be replaced by a model that more closely resembles the
civilian sphere of employment. With the end of conscription, the military had to adapt to the
changing environment and attract people for reasons other than the values they espouse. This
includes creating tangible benefits that entice individuals to pursue careers in the military.
Moskos asserted that “The sum of these and related developments is to confirm the ascendancy
of the occupational model in the emergent military” (p. 45). The reason this issue is so pertinent
to the current discussion involves the change in motivations that Moskos predicted/advocated.
His predecessors either neglected the issue of motivations for joining the military or
misconstrued the underlying premise and were unable to account for the change in recruitment
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and retention issues that accompany military enlistment without the safety net of conscription.
The esprit de corps and “corporateness” concepts advocated by Huntington and Janowitz
respectively were put to the test alongside the occupational model throughout much of the 1980s
and 1990s.
Section 2.3.1 The Moskos/Janowitz Debate
In a stinging rebuke to the I-O model presented by Moskos, Janowitz published an article
in Armed Forces & Society (1977) discrediting the term “institutional” as opposed to the more
commonly used term of “profession,” and calling into question the overall notion that the
military is going through a transition away from its traditional model. Instead, he argued, the
convergence process that he had advocated almost 20 years earlier was still in process but not yet
complete (p. 53). Regarding the use of the term “institutional,” Janowitz asserted that there is no
logical reason for anything other than the term profession to be used because it connotes several
components that are systemic in all professions, to include: (1) a high level of skill, (2) selfregulation, and (3) corporate cohesion. There would have to be an overall decline in the skill
level and self-management of the military for the military to degrade to an occupation, and
neither of the two was occurring. There were signs of discontent among the cohesion of the
officer corps, nevertheless, it was weakened to the point that it lost its corporate identity (p. 52).
In short, the military was still a profession, not just a job.
In his dissection of the disagreements between the two authors, Sorensen (1994) pointed
out that both men were arguing more over concepts than facts, particularly as it relates to the
terms they were using. For instance, Moskos spent most of his time addressing the military as an
organization, whereas Janowitz focused more on the military as a profession. Moskos saw the
way military organizations were changing and posited that occupations were more likely to

31

attract new recruits instead of the mission, vision, and values they espoused. Janowitz was
arguing that the military was converging with the civilian sector regarding how they operated,
yet the military as a profession remained unchanged. It is also worth noting that much of
Janowitz’s arguments focused strictly on the officer corps, which has always been a smaller
percentage of the military than those enlisted, and it was from the perspective of the enlisted
Soldier that Moskos wrote his first work on civil-military relations. These two spheres in the
military are separate and distinct, making it hard to generalize the military without considering
both sets of the population. When accounting for the entire military population, Moskos
identified four perspectives the military man has towards: himself, his colleagues, the military
organization, and his job. Moskos found that the military man is going to be less concerned with
self-interest and more focused on the “higher good” of the organization (p. 603). This will
manifest itself by way of how he performs his work and how he treats his colleagues. Janowitz,
on the other hand, was less concerned with these aspects and focused exclusively on the
cohesiveness of the officer corps. This conceptual disagreement was likely compounded by the
remnants of the Vietnam War and lack of trust in government among the civil populace.
In two subsequent articles (1986; 1988), Moskos modified his original argument that “a
shift in the rationale in the military toward the occupational model implies organizational
consequences and, perhaps, the function of the armed forces” (1977, p. 45) to a trend occurring
within the military (1986, p. 377). The trend towards an occupational model was not going to
change the overall structural integrity of military institutions (i.e., the profession); rather, it
would just change the way some of the jobs (i.e., occupation) the military performs. Figure 2.1 in
Appendix D replicates the visual created by Sorensen (1994) that shows the difference between
the two models. As can be seen, by the two diagrams, the original theory conceived by Moskos
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postulated a paradigmatic shift in how the military was to operate. However, this view was later
modified to allow for more diversity in the scope and methods of the military, while at the same
time retaining its structure and traditions.
Section 2.3.3 Empirical Examinations of the I-O Model
Janowitz and Moskos spent much of their time debating the merits of the new I-O model,
but Stahl, Manley, & McNichols (1981) were the first to put it to the empirical test. At the time
of their writing, the most frequently cited method for measuring the cosmopolitan-local construct
was research conducted by A.W. Gouldner (1957, 1958). Gouldner attempted to measure the
construct for college faculty with an instrument of approximately 100 questions and through this
research, he developed the cosmopolitan-local measurement. Several subsequent studies used the
same measurement to study other populations, including accountants, scientists, and engineers
(some examples include Pelz, 1956; Shepherd, 1961; Glaser, 1963; Goldberg, Baker, &
Rubenstein, 1965; Schroeder & Imdieke, 1977); yet this method was not directly applied to the
military because the previous studies were designed to examine the contributions these
individuals made to the field of science and engineering. Such a focus could not be directly
applied to the military; the authors chose to use the I-O model in their study by creating an eightquestion survey to be completed by members of the U.S. Air Force. Approximately 20,000
questionnaires were sent to a random sample of active-duty Air Force personnel below the
general officer grade in April 1977. Of the 10,687 usable responses returned to the team from a
sample that included servicemembers from all enlisted ranks, as well as all officer grades
through colonel. The length of service ranged from less than 1 year to over 27 years of service
and they were assigned to all major commands in the Air Force, both active and reserve. Their
educational levels ranged from high school up to doctoral degrees who worked in a variety of job
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specialties and were in several geographic areas. Their research yielded some crucial
conclusions, most importantly that the I-O model was not to be considered a “zero-sum game” as
Janowitz asserted in his initial critique of the model. Instead, these concepts should be viewed as
separate dimensions where individuals can have various levels of each. Moreover, they found
that the institutional orientation was positively associated with career intent, seniority, and job
satisfaction, whereas the occupational orientation was negatively associated with those criteria.
Individuals with more years of service, seniority, and higher levels of job satisfaction were more
likely to identify with the institutional values of the Air Force. Conversely, those with lower
levels in these areas identified more with the occupational concept of Moskos’ model. This
study, completed shortly after Moskos created and refined the I-O model, helped establish it as a
prominent theory in the field of both sociology and psychology.
In a similar study, Segal, Blair, Lengermann, & Thompson (1979) surmised that the
United States armed forces had undergone three major interrelated changes between World War
II and the Vietnam War. First, along with other industrial nations of the western world, they had
abandoned the practice of rapidly mobilizing forces in times of war and then demobilizing them
in post-war periods, choosing instead to maintain a large standing force-in-being. Second, was
their abandonment of conscription in favor of an all-volunteer force. Third, they argued that the
primary function of the military had been redefined, as its mission is not just to wage war, but
also to contribute to stability in the international system through deterrence or the promotion of
law and order. These four themes identified structural changes in military organization
engendered by changing definitions of the military institution being debated by Moskos and
Janowitz. Much like Stahl et al. (1978), they too found that the new modern soldier seemed to be
motivated by factors that were partly institutional or normative and partly occupational or
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rationalistic. These findings suggested a trend in the direction of the occupational model, but this
is hard to validate since there was no empirical evidence to support the esprit de corps advocated
by Huntington or Janowitz’s “corporateness” concept.
Putting the I-O Model to the test once again, Stahl, Manley, & McNichols (1981)
expanded their previous study to include personnel in the Marine Corps, but they also dove
deeper into the distinctions between the Air Force personnel they surveyed a few years earlier.
Their study addressed a series of nine detailed research questions to dig deeply into the data. As
can be seen by the questions, the authors were attempting to dig deeper into the various
demographics represented in their dataset. Their study found that roughly 20% of the
respondents tested high in both institution and occupation, with the remaining 80% were equally
distributed across the rest of the categories. They also generated some critical empirical
observations that contradict previous assumptions. For instance, they found the Noncommissioned officers had by far the highest levels of institution, a finding that undermined
Huntington’s argument that the officer corps embraced the esprit de corps (what Moskos
referred to as institutional values) more than their enlisted counterparts.
Taken as a whole, these three studies uncovered a key empirical distinction between the
theory originally posited by Moskos (and subsequently modified in later work). Even though
Figure 2.1 provides a pictorial representation of the evolution of Moskos’ I-O model – which
essentially places institution and occupation at the end of two spectrums – these articles all
conclude that the I-O Model should be construed as a 2 x 2 table consisting of both low and high
dimensions in both categories. Figure 2.2 (Appendix D) depicts their conclusions as it relates to
the various dimensions of the I-O model. It is possible for someone to score high in both areas,
high in one and low in another, or low in both areas. Their findings suggest that there is a
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broader range of servicemembers who choose to enter the military because they affiliate with the
institutional values of a particular branch of service and they are attracted to a specific line of
work (i.e., occupation).
Segal (1986) observed that individuals will join the military for both institutional and
occupational reasons; still, there was not enough data at the time of his writing to determine if
the trend described by Moskos was coming to fruition. Instead, he concluded that both reasons
can coexist, though the all-volunteer force is likely to lead to an increase in people who join for
economic reasons. This type of reasoning is likely to lead toward a “pragmatic professionalism”
(p. 364) found within the military, where individuals are motivated by certain
economic/occupational variables. At the same time, they must be willing to adhere to the
institutional values of a particular service branch. Unlike Segal, Eighmey (2006) had the data
available via the 2001, 2003, and 2004 Department of Defense Youth Polls to observe the
motivations young men and women had for enlisting in the military. Much like Segal, Eighmey
found a range of interests that could be said to generally reflect a material or occupational
perspective on military service were identified, yet his analysis also revealed value-oriented or
institutional themes present within their decision-making processes. There was a mix of both
self-orientation (occupational perspectives) and other-orientation (institutional perspectives)
present in their decision-making processes (p. 327). These findings are particularly interesting
because it shines a light on the presence, but not dominance, of the occupational model originally
advocated by Moskos. Rather, it falls more in line with the modification to the model he made in
a subsequent writing, which asserted that the occupational model would be inevitably introduced
into the military institution, yet it would not completely supplant the institutional model that
existed since the military’s inception.
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Some studies have also suggested that institutional values are predominant in motivating
individuals to serve in the military. Woodruff, Kelty, and Segal (2006) found that institutional
motivators like patriotism or a desire to serve played a central role in determining enlistment
propensity in high school seniors preparing to enter active duty in a combat-arms military
occupational specialty (MOS). Multiple studies by Griffith (2008, 2009) found that institutional
factors are just as important in those serving in the Reserves and National Guard. When
observing reservists, Griffith’s (2009) findings suggest that material incentives may increase
recruitment and retention; nevertheless, these incentives do not lead to enhanced readiness.
Instead, incentives that foster normative and affective commitments, such as joining and staying
for camaraderie and service to country, were found in self-reports of career intentions and
perceived unit readiness. The importance of institutional motives was particularly evident, even
at a time when more demands are being placed on reservists (p. 233). He also found that men and
women serving in the National Guard component were more likely to reenlist for institutionally
motivated reasons than their occupationally motivated peers (2008, p. 245). These findings run
counter to the notion that occupational motives are likely to predominate an all-volunteer
military, especially at a time when the United States was fighting in two wars simultaneously.
Overall, the contribution that Moskos’ I-O model has made to understand why people
join the military is significant. As previously stated, the concept goes much further in better
understanding the demographic of people who choose to take the extraordinary step of
committing a portion of their lives to defend our country from foreign aggression. Prior to his
work, the status quo established by Huntington was built solely on the notion that these
individuals had a spirited desire to do so and it was innate only to the officer corps. Upon closer
examination, we can see that this desire is not an intrinsic value that only officers possess. It is
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something that can be influenced by the work performed and it is not relegated only to
commissioned officers. Both Moskos and the scholars who built upon his foundation have helped
uncover a wealth of information regarding this unique group within the American citizenry. With
the shortcomings found in the I-O model, it is necessary to delve into the topic using another
prominent theory of motivation in the public sector.
Section 2.4 Public Service Motivation Antecedents
In the wake of the Watergate Scandal and the end of the Vietnam War, a deep skepticism
in government reached its breaking point (Lipset & Schneiders, 1987). No longer were
government institutions being trusted to do what is right and this led to a “quiet crisis” in the
federal civil service (Levine & Kleeman, 1986). Despite the gloomy outlook on public
bureaucracies, a strand of research was building within the social sciences, to include public
administration, that went beyond assumptions of the rational choice model of the economic man
in government. Some did not completely dismiss the self-interests of the individual and began to
examine certain normative incentives that could play a larger role in choosing to enter the public
sector. Sociologists Knoke & Wright-Isak (1982) developed a blended model of motivation that
accounts for the influence of emotional attachments and social norms, as well as the utility
calculations of rational choice. They refer to the emotional attachments that individuals develop
with other persons or groups as “affective bonding” and actions governed by societal norms of
moral and ethical behavior as “normative conformity” (p. 210). The collective effect of these
three forms of motivations influences an individual to contribute effort or resources for the
benefit of a collective action organization. Their typology consisted of three categories of
motivation - rational choice, affective bonding, and normative conformity – that collective action
organizations can use to create incentives for employment. Examples of affective incentives may
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include an emotional connection between the individual and the persons and groups in the
community to whom he or she is bonded (i.e., community). Normative incentives consist of
societal values like civic duty, moral obligation, or contributing to the improvement of society.
Similarly, Etzioni (1988) argued that an individual’s “moral commitment to shared concerns” (p.
56) was a guiding force in their prosocial behavior. This investment is made up of three separate,
but equal parts: commitment to adhere to laws, regulations, and norms; a commitment of some
effort to influence public affairs; and a commitment to allot some portion of time and effort to
service to the public. Taken together, these contribute to a person’s pursuit of gratification and
moral obligation, where gratification is pursuing the “I” perspective and moral obligation is
pursuing the “We” perspective (1983, p. 92).
At the same time, public administration scholars were beginning to examine why
individuals choose to work for certain organizations. Perry & Porter (1982) argued that more
time and attention was spent observing why individuals joined industrial and business
organizations at the expense of looking at the motivations behind joining public organizations. In
response, they developed a framework to assess the motivational context of working in public
organizations. They argued that when observing four variables – the individual, the job, the work
environment, and the external environment – there would be a distinct difference between the
motivations behind joining the public versus the private sector. Furthermore, Rainey (1982)
conducted one of the earliest empirical studies on reward preferences. Motivated in part by a
“search of the service ethic” (p. 288), he compared differences in reward preferences across
employees in both public and private organizations. Based on surveys of middle managers in
four state and four private organizations, he found evidence to support the notion that there is a
difference in motivations for joining a public organization, largely due to the presence of ethical
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values within public employees (p. 299). The findings from both studies point to similar
attributes within individuals that are concerned with others more than self, something that runs
counter to the purely rational economic man that dominated much of the social science literature
throughout the middle part of the 20th century. There was something different and unique about
the public servant, as compared to his private-sector counterpart.
Frederickson & Hart (1985) took the issue to an even deeper level with their notion of the
“benevolent patriot.” These authors asserted that the continual process of integrating the values
of business administration into the public sector has devalued the field and allowed public
servants to pursue their private ambitions within public institutions. This “privatization” of
public administration has created a culture where “careerism” is valued over idealism (p. 547).
Instead, they argue that “all public administration must rest upon, and be guided by, the
moral truths embodied in the enabling documents of our national foundation” (p. 548). To
illustrate their point, Frederickson & Hart compared German and Danish public servants and
citizens during World War II. After the war was over, most German bureaucrats claimed they
had no choice but to carry out the commands of their superiors, as that was their primary duty as
public servants. On the other hand, when Denmark was occupied by the Germans in 1940, they
were required to disenfranchise Danish Jews and deport stateless Jews to the concentration
camps. However, to the surprise of the Germans, Danish bureaucrats, as well as virtually every
segment of their society, refused to do so and did everything within their power to protect and
preserve Jews facing extermination. These bureaucrats risked their professional careers to fulfill
their primary professional obligation of guaranteeing the rights of all peoples (p. 548-549).
Frederickson & Hart attempted to show that patriotism is more than just the love of one’s
country; rather, it also includes a commitment to the democratic principles upon which the
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country is governed. In the case of the German bureaucrats, they believed they were being
patriotic by carrying out the wishes of governmental leaders, despite it being done at the expense
of the rights of the people. The Danes, on the other hand, were guided by the democratic
principles of fairness and individual rights and these qualities were superior to the wishes of
German occupational forces. They valued human life over their careers, and this is the essence of
the “patriotism of benevolence” they advocated. Because of this, public servants must be both
“moral philosophers and moral activists”, and this requires both a love of country and a love of
others (p. 551). Much akin to the benevolent patriot theory, Kelman (1987) posited that good
public policy requires “the presence of a significant public spirit in the veins of the body politic”
and that government should be the place where people can display a concern they want to show
for others (p. 81). This concern comes through the formulation of sound public policies, yet this
pursuit can also be construed as a rational action from the perspective of public choice scholars,
like Downs (1957) and Buchanan & Tullock (1962) sought to describe. These men all advocated
the importance of policy formulation that considers the collective over the individual, but such
reasoning does not fully account for why individuals pursue public sector careers over the private
sector. Finally, Staats (1988) argued that work within this field requires a certain attitude
accompanied by a sense of duty; yet those alone are insufficient, as a sense of public morality
must be present within the bureaucrat. This was echoed by Wilson (1993), who emphasized
sympathy, fairness, and duty as three components of the moral sense, which can function
separately or alongside as motivators of altruistic behavior. (p. 30). Both men concluded that the
guiding distinction between the public and private sectors was the presence of morality in the
performance of the public servant.
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Section 2.5 Public Service Motivation Theory
Building off the work of Knoke & Wright-Isak (1982), Perry & Wise (1990) introduced
Public Service Motivation theory (PSM), which they defined as “an individual's predisposition to
respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions” (p. 368). This theory
has guided much of the literature regarding motivation in the public sector over the last 30 years.
They recognized that motivation can be categorized as rational, normative, affective. The authors
described rational motives as actions grounded in individual utility maximization. They
conceded the rational motives that individuals may have to participate in with the formulation of
public policy or the advocacy of specific interests with which they personally identify; although,
they argued that other factors are just as valuable. Included in their decision-making processes
are norm-based motives, which refer to actions generated by efforts to conform to norms.
Individuals can have a desire to serve the public interest out of a sense of loyalty and desire
social equity among the population at the same time. Perry & Wise referred to affective motives
as triggers of behavior that are grounded in emotional responses to various social contexts or
what Frederickson & Hart refer to as the “patriotism of benevolence.” Table 2.2 provides a
summary of the three concepts introduced by the authors. Taken together, the authors posited
that these three attributes constitute a public service motivation, and individuals who pursue
careers in the public service are likely to have high levels of all three attributes.
While these concepts are not necessarily new to the discussion on motivation theory in
the public sector, the authors provided a series of hypotheses1 to be tested in future research.
About the first hypothesis, the authors assumed what many scholars have asserted in previous
studies, namely that public organizations will attract and/or select employees with similar

1

A copy of the hypotheses created by Perry & Wise (1990) can be found in Appendix G.
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personal attributes and these personal attributes, in turn, will influence how employees react to
the organization.
In short, if individuals have high levels of all three attributes, they will be more likely to
join a public sector organization. If such logic is correct, then one would expect a natural
progression into their second hypothesis, that people with high levels of PSM working in public
organizations will have higher levels of performance. This is in large part due to the level of
commitment that individuals have towards the organization and its mission. By being committed
to the organization, they are going to work hard to carry out its mission daily. Finally, their third
hypothesis countered the rational/economic man theory, in that organizations with employees
possessing high levels of PSM will not have to rely on the monetary/economic incentives to
induce high-performance levels. If the second hypothesis is correct, one would expect
individuals to perform well because they are committed to the mission, not the tangible
incentives they may receive.
Their purpose for creating these hypotheses stemmed primarily from a lack of empirical
research on the motivations for joining public organizations. Several arguments for this behavior
have been put forth, despite little evidence supporting any existing theories. Perry & Wise took
the natural step of creating hypotheses that can be empirically tested to determine if all the extant
literature on the uniqueness of public service is both reliable and accurate. They identified three
areas where research can further the study of public service. The priority should be conducting
empirical studies using their hypotheses, effectively doing so requires certain measurement
methods to ensure the research meets the appropriate standards. Developing proper tools to
define and measure motivations is an undertaking. Last, scholars should find ways to instill these
characteristics in potential public servants. If the government is going to overcome the
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overwhelming lack of trust in the public eye, more people with normative and affective attributes
need to be in positions of responsibility to help turn the tide.
Section 2.5.1 Measuring PSM
Building on his previous work with Wise, Perry (1996) created a scale to measure PSM
within public employees to close the gap between assertion and empirical research. Even though
Perry & Wise (1990) pointed to the various types of motives (rational, normative, affective) an
individual will have, the ability to determine the level or amount of each motive the person had
was indiscernible. He broke each motive down into six dimensions – attraction to policymaking,
commitment to the public interest, social justice, civic duty, compassion, and self-sacrifice – that
are unique to each type of motivation. The result was a survey instrument that would allow
researchers to measure the levels of each motivation within an individual. Using a Likert scale of
1 to 5 for each of the 40 statements in the survey, individuals could rank how high they value
certain attributes associated with their types of motivation. To test his new instrument, Perry
issued the survey to both MPA and MBA students and allowed them to provide feedback on the
survey after it was completed. His results pointed toward a paired down measurement of four
specific dimensions of motivation (attraction to public policymaking, commitment to the public
interest/civic duty, compassion, self-sacrifice) that can gauge an individual’s motivation for
going into public service.
Section 2.5.2 Correlates of PSM
Perry (1997) once again added to the study of PSM by looking into certain variables that
will likely have a direct effect on a person’s decision to enter public service. This study
investigated the relationship of PSM to five sets of correlates: parental socialization, religious
socialization, professional identification, political ideology, and individual demographic
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characteristics. Perry developed a set of hypotheses for each correlate and tested them on 295
survey responses. Table 2.3 (Appendix H) provides the hypothesis for each correlate. Based on
the results, four of the variables – closeness to God, parental socialization, education, and age –
were significant in at least one equation in the direction predicted. Religious worldview and
parental relations were the only variables not significant in any of the four equations (p. 187).
Despite some unexpected outcomes, their research uncovered several anomalous relationships
and more complex relationships between antecedents and dimensions of PSM than originally had
been predicted. Additionally, they opened the door for more substantive research to be conducted
on the study of PSM, its antecedents, and ways in which to measure the dimensions within each
form of motivation.
Section 2.5.3 Empirical Examinations PSM Theory
Since publishing their theory on public service motivation, dozens of authors have
written hundreds of empirical studies using the work of Perry & Wise. In fact, it has become one
of the most popular theories within the study of public administration, both within the United
States and internationally. Several groupings within the public sector have been observed at all
echelons of government. These studies have shed much light on the different motivations people
have for joining the public sector and why they continue to do so. Because there is not enough
room to summarize and evaluate every published article on the topic, this section focuses on a
handful of articles that have been cited the most over within the first 25 years of PSM’s
existence. In the following pages, I consider the merits and shortcomings of the theory, then
describe instances where it has been shown to have explanatory power and where it comes up
short. I also address the dearth of research on a large segment of the public sector population (the
military) and how this study seeks to mitigate the problem.
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Shortly after Perry published his writings on a potential measurement tool, the
antecedents of PSM, Crewson (1997) created an empirical study of the theory by using
previously published data from the General Social Survey (GSS), the 1979 Federal Employee
Attitude Survey (FEAS), and the 1994 member survey of electrical engineers (IEEE). Using
these data sources, he set out in search of answers to four questions that relate to the theory of
public service motivation. These questions focused on the following: 1) the incidence of public
service reward motivations, 2) consistency of these motivations over time, 3) their impact on
organizational performance, and 4) the ramifications of a public-service ethic for the theory of
representative bureaucracy. Crewson argued that these questions are necessary to the study of
motivation because they focus on the relationship between reward motivations and
organizational performance, as well as the effect, if any, on attitudes toward the role of
government. Using both descriptive and multivariate statistics, his analysis concluded that there
are generalizable and stable differences in the reward motivations between public- and privatesector employees. Moreover, there is evidence that public service motivation in the federal sector
is positively related to an individual’s commitment to the organization. Conversely, there is no
evidence that public-policy attitudes vary between those who are and those who are not public
service-oriented. Public sector employees are less likely to be interested in economic rewards
than private-sector employees and more likely to value intrinsic service rewards than their
private-sector counterparts (p. 516).
Adding substance to the “fledgling” theory of PSM, Brewer and Selden (1998) attempted
to link public service motivation to prosocial behaviors by observing data collected by the 1992
Merit Principles Survey conducted by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) regarding
whistleblowing. While previous studies had focused on employee attitudes, none of them had
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linked attitudes to actual behaviors. The authors found that federal whistleblowers acted in ways
consistent with the theory of PSM. In short, federal employees were motivated by a genuine
concern for the public interest. Furthermore, they are high performers who report high levels of
achievement, job commitment, and job satisfaction. Finally, federal whistleblowers are likely to
work in high-forming workgroups and organizations. Overall, this study provided strong
empirical support for the theory. However, their findings did not suggest that PSM is perfectly
correlated with the public sector or uniformly distributed among public servants. Rather, there is
likely a dynamic variation across the public institutional workforce (p. 418).
Naff and Crum (1999) also looked at whether public sector employees have different
values and respond to different incentives than private-sector employees by examining responses
of nearly 10, 000 federal employees to the MSPB’s 1996 Merit Principle Survey results. Despite
only containing a subset of the scale used in Perry’s survey (1996), they found significant
relationships between the tenets of PSM and federal employees’ job satisfaction, performance,
intention to remain with the government, and support for the government’s reinvention efforts.
Their results also found no significant differences in the response rates of employees based on
sex, race, grade level, or employing department. The authors found no evidence of a relationship
between PSM and plans to leave the government. Conversely, they suggested other factors are
correlated with these attitudes and behaviors, and should be accounted for in future studies. For
instance, they found, along with other researchers including Perry & Wise (1990), that job
satisfaction is affected by such factors as age, gender, race, education, grade level, and tenure.
The MSPB results also showed that both women and minorities tend to get higher performance
ratings than men. The authors suggested undertaking multivariate analyses to determine if PSM
has an independent impact over and above those caused by these other factors (p. 10).
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Brewer, Selden, and Facer (2000) sought to build on a stream of research regarding PSM
by examining how individuals view the motives associated with public service. The authors
introduced an intensive research technique called Q-methodology to the study of public service
and examined the motives of 69 individuals. The methodology consists of a process in which
individuals sort statements about a particular topic according to how strongly they agree or
disagree with each statement (Stephenson, 1953). Like Perry’s Likert Scale survey, the approach
requires respondents to express their attitudes by ranking the statements, and once the rankings
are completed, the results are supposed to reflect the individual's worldview about the topic
being studied (Brown & Ungs, 1970). Their findings identified four distinct conceptions of PSM
and referred to individuals holding these conceptions as Samaritans, Communitarians, Patriots,
and Humanitarians. First, Samaritans are individuals strongly motivated to help other people and
see themselves as guardians of the underprivileged. They are most likely emotionally motivated
to act when they observe people in distress. Second, Communitarians are motivated and stirred
by sentiments of civic duty and public service. They believe in a strong connection between
public servants and citizens; they are likely to get involved in issues about their local
communities. They tend to associate public service with government service and can develop a
sense of elitism and pride because of their embrace of higher ethical standards and expectations
for public officials. Communitarians are also more likely to value good deeds over financial
incentives. Patriots are prone to pursue causes greater than themselves. They desire to protect,
advocate, and work for the good of the public in general. They choose “duty over self” and
“would risk personal loss to help someone else" (p. 260). This group of individuals strongly
correlates with the benevolent patriots espoused by Frederickson and Hart (1985). Finally,
Humanitarians are motivated by their strong sense of social justice and public service. Like the
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Samaritans, this group is attracted to public causes and/or programs, and they view the
government as the mechanism for producing social equity. Where Samaritans are likely to find
personal gratification in their efforts, Humanitarians find this type of pursuit more rewarding
than personal achievements. Their findings revealed that PSM is more complex than portrayed in
previous studies that have explored these concepts and contrasted public and private sector
employees. The major contribution made by these authors was the conceptualizing of different
types of public servants. As can be seen by other studies, PSM describes individual motivations
in terms of dimensions rather than a spectrum.
Using the General Social Survey from 1991, 1993, and 1994, Houston (2000) compared
public and private sector workers regarding the incentives that each group values most highly in
a job. After laying out 5 separate hypotheses, Houston examined the data through a multivariate
logistic regression and the results showed that public employees are more likely to place a higher
value on the intrinsic reward of work that provides a feeling of accomplishment, while privatesector employees are more likely to place a higher value on such extrinsic reward motivators as
high income and short work hours (p. 725). Even if these results are much in line with the
findings of previous studies, the contribution made by Houston to the study of PSM was the use
of a multivariate analysis of survey data collected using a national sampling frame. The findings
also provided a strong counterpoint to the notion that public institutions need to adopt privatesector incentives. For instance, Houston’s findings correlated with studies by Kellough & Lu
(1993) and Ingraham (1993), which found that pay-for-performance systems in public-sector
organizations were largely unsuccessful. In sum, this study helped confirm the argument that
government reform efforts intended to make government organizations conform to private sector
practices are unlikely to be effective.
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In a similar study, Alonso and Lewis (2001) used multiple regression and logit analyses
in two large surveys of federal employees. The first set came from the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management (OPM). Their Survey of Federal Employees (SOFE91) was sent to 56,767
employees in November 1991 and February 1992 and received a response rate of 54%. Second
was the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), which mailed its 1996 Merit Principles
Survey (MPS96) to 18,163 federal employees and got a response rate of 53%. Their article tested
the link between PSM and job performance in the federal service. They found mixed evidence on
whether PSM positively affected grades and performance ratings but there was clearer evidence
that employees who expected to receive a material reward for exceptional performance attained
higher grades and performance ratings. They found no evidence that the link between material
rewards and performance mattered any less to those with high PSM. It is worth emphasizing that
only federal employees were surveyed, so the overall sample of the public sector population was
limited; their results did cast doubt on the argument that individual incentive programs are less
effective or are even counterproductive in a high-PSM environment (p. 377).
Lewis and Frank (2002) explored how the individual demographic characteristics can
influence the importance they place on various job qualities, as well as their preference
for employment in the public sector. Using data from 1989 and 1998 General Social Surveys,
they too employed a logistic regression model to see if certain types of people were more drawn
to the public sector. The authors looked at demographic characteristics including age, race,
gender, education, military service, and political party affiliation. In short, they assumed people
would prefer to work for the sector that provides more of the rewards they value most.
Those who valued job security and service to the public would be more likely to pursue a
government job. Conversely, those who valued pay would prefer whichever sector will pay them
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the most. They also looked at how these characteristics contributed to their ability to secure
government jobs. For instance, they assumed that women, minorities, and veterans should expect
higher pay advantages in government jobs than comparably educated and experienced white
men. They found that minorities, veterans, Democrats, and older Americans preferred publicsector jobs more than whites, nonveterans, Republicans, and younger Americans. Most
importantly, their findings confirmed that all levels of government face the enormous challenge
of attracting the best and brightest of the younger generation into public service (p. 401).
Following the work of Rainey & Steinbauer (1999), an empirical study of organizational
performance by Brewer & Selden (2000), Kim (2005) sought to determine if PSM contributes to
the overall performance of an organization. He tested the effects of four variables – job
satisfaction, affective commitment, PSM, and organizational citizenship behavior – on
organizational performance in the public sector of South Korea. Much like his predecessors, he
hypothesized that several motivation factors would affect an organization’s productivity, and
after analyzing the survey data of 1,739 public employees in government agencies, the
hypothesized relationships in his model were confirmed. More specifically, he found that all four
of these variables positively impact organizational performance. His study added more credence
to the explanatory power of PSM in the field of motivation theory. It is important to note that
Kim’s study was the first to use PSM to study non-American public sector employment. His
work inspired others to begin broadening the scope and scale of PSM in the field of public
administration.
Houston (2006) also broadened the study of PSM to look not only at the work conducted
by public employees but also their participation in public services on their off-duty time. He
broadened the field by looking at employees working in the non-profit sector. Houston studied
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the involvement in charitable activities of public, nonprofit, and private workers. Once again, he
used multivariate logistic regression models to examine data from the 2002 General Social
Survey, which compiled responses from employees in each category regarding self-reported
contributions of time, blood, and money to charitable organizations. He found that government
employees were more likely to volunteer for a charity and to donate blood than for-profit
employees. Similarly, nonprofit workers were also more likely than their for-profit counterparts
to volunteer. Finally, no difference was found among public service and private employees in
terms of individual philanthropy, as both groups were just as likely to commit their free time to
supporting a worthy cause that assisted other citizens. These findings lent more support to the
notion that PSM is more likely to be found in public service institutions than in private
organizations. This study was significant because it went beyond job performance, or even job
satisfaction for that matter, and shed light on the overall activities of individuals working in the
public sector. In short, these individuals are more likely to serve others through their daily work,
as well as in their free time.
Moynihan & Pandey (2007) chose to focus their attention on the antecedent Perry's
(1997) theory by examining the role that organizational factors play in shaping public service
motivation. This interesting approach chose to look at how organizations impact PSM in much
the same way that institutions influence individuals in Moskos’ model. Using an OLS regression
analysis, Moynihan & Pandey examined 274 responses (approximately 53% response rate)
collected as part of Phase II of the National Administrative Studies Project (NASP-II) during
2002-03. Based on eight separate hypotheses, they found that PSM is strongly and positively
related to level of education and membership in professional organizations. Similarly,
hierarchical authority and reform efforts also have a positive relationship. These results strongly
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support the influence of organizational institutions on PSM, acknowledging that exposure to the
minutiae of bureaucracy – what they refer to as “red tape” – and length of organizational
membership are negatively related to public service motivation. As a practical point of departure,
the authors concluded that public organizations have an opportunity and responsibility to create a
positive environment that enables employees to feel they are contributing to the public good.
Vandenabeele’s (2008) study did not contain any empirical observations, but it was much
in line with the efforts of Perry (2000) and Moynihan & Pandey (2007) to determine the origins
of PSM. His primary intent was to cement PSM as a dominant theory within public
administration by synthesizing the theoretical contributions found in the extant literature, at the
same time refining them to create a systematic and coherent theory that is standardized
throughout the field. For this to occur, Vandenabeele argued that a universal definition should be
created for both PSM and the institutions within which it is being observed. Despite the
commonly used definition of PSM created by Perry & Wise (1990), Vandenabeele pointed out
that there is not widespread agreement over how best to describe the term. In response, he put
forth a general description of PSM as “the belief, values and attitudes that go beyond self-interest
and organizational interest, that concern the interest of a larger political entity and that motivate
individuals to act accordingly whenever appropriate” (p. 547). Vandenabeele also sought to
create commonly agreed-upon assumptions of PSM within the study of public institutions. As an
operational theory PSM assumes that individuals operate in different types of institutions who
also operate in environments with two essential components. First, these institutions embrace the
public service values inherent to American governance, such as politics and policymaking,
public interest, democratic values, self-sacrifice, and compassion. Second, these institutions exist
to respond to the psychological needs of the individuals in a society. Based on how effective
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these institutions respond to the needs of the society, the public service values within the
individual serving in government will change (p. 553). As institutions become more effective at
responding to the needs of society, public service values within an individual will become more
internalized. The contributions made by Vandenabeele appear to have accomplished two primary
objectives. First, it put forth a more universal concept through which to study individual
motivations in the public sector. Second, it cemented PSM as a dominant theory within the field
of public administration.
On the heels of Vandenabeele’s work, three separate writings helped confirm the
concepts laid out in his argument. Pandey & Stazyk (2008) concluded in their summary of the
antecedents and correlates of PSM that it is possible to determine how these values can develop
within an individual, particularly when the employee agrees with the organization’s values. PSM
does in fact play a positive role in the overall behavior and effectiveness of public organizations.
Institutional values can enhance PSM within an individual and thereby enhance the overall
effectiveness of the institution. Next, Steijn (2008) used PSM to look at Dutch civil servants and
found that they are likely to have more PSM than their private sector counterparts. Despite other
studies making the same conclusions, Steijn took the same approach as Kim and applied the
theory to non-Americans working in government. His findings confirmed that PSM was
becoming an international theory.
Finally, Wright & Pandey (2008) also looked at the relationship between PSM and job
satisfaction and found there is not a direct relationship. Rather, PSM is mediated by the extent to
which an individual agrees with the values of the organization. In their analysis of data collected
from a 2005 survey of managerial and professional employees in four local and three state
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government organizations in the northeastern United States, the findings supported the notion of
a dynamic and symbiotic nature between PSM and institutional values.
Arguably the most comprehensive study of PSM came in 2013 from the collaborative
work of Kim, Perry, Bradley, Vandenabeele, and 12 other scholars, who developed a revised
measurement instrument consisting of 20 questions using a 5-point Likert scale that measures the
four dimensions of PSM – attraction to public service, commitment to public values, selfsacrifice, and compassion. Table 2.4 (Appendix I) describes each dimension of the theory; yet, it
should be noted that they proposed a change to one of the dimensions. Instead of attraction to
public participation, it should be attraction to public service. After creating the new tool, they
surveyed public servants from 12 different countries and found that, despite PSM becoming an
internationally recognized theory, that the exact meaning and scaling of PSM dimensions are
likely to differ across cultures and languages (p. 96). Their pursuit of a truly universal theory did
not come to fruition, despite the conglomerate of authors finding some practical implications for
future research. For example, one byproduct was the creation of a better instrument for surveying
public employees. Despite the survey’s shortcomings, one positive conclusion was that the tool
was most effective in surveying populations within Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, a finding that bodes well for the present study.
In their survey of the literature on PSM over its first 25 years of existence, Ritz, Brewer,
and Neumann (2016) pointed out the relative explosion of scholarly work on the subject. At the
time of their writing, 323 studies had been published in the English language, with the largest
increases occurring between 2012 and 2014. Interestingly, most of those publications came from
first-time authors. It is also worth pointing out that an overwhelming majority of these studies
used data collected from countries other than the United States, as over 70% of the studies
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looked at populations in Europe and Asia (p. 416-417). These results suggest that PSM is a topic
of interest to many within the field of public administration on a global scale. One specific
demographic within the field of public service was grossly under-represented, as only one study
within this time period had looked at PSM in the military.
Section 2.6 I-O Model and PSM
After surveying the literature on theories of motivation, both inside and outside of public
administration, the consensus appears to be that individuals who are attracted to public service
are likely to have higher levels of PSM than those who seek careers in the private sector. These
individuals are also likely to be attracted to the values espoused by a public institution or
organization. However, these findings beg the question of whether one has more explanatory
power than the other?
This question served as the focal point for a singular study of motivation theory within
the United States Army. In the fall of 2011, Taylor, Clerkin, Ngaruiya, & Velez (2015) surveyed
174 Special Forces Soldiers stationed at Fort Bragg, NC using an instrument that combined the
20-question survey created by Kim et al. (2013), the institutional and occupational motivations,
as well as possible monetary dimension created by Woodruff, Kelty, & Segal (2006). By doing
so, they were able to determine directly from participants which one of the theory’s main
suppositions was more compatible with their motives for joining the Army and their decision to
continue serving after their initial contracts expired. Within the first hypothesis, the authors
tested the four dimensions of PSM used by Kim et al. (2013) alongside the I-O and monetary
dimensions and found that all four dimensions were positively correlated with the institutional
values posited in the Moskos model, thus confirming each sub-hypothesis. Each dimension was
statistically significant at the .0001 level (p. 150). By applying the same four dimensions to
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reenlistment potential, they found attraction to public service, commitment to public values, and
self-sacrifice were positively correlated with an individual’s decision to reenlist, except none
were statistically significant. The compassion dimension was negatively correlated with the
decision to reenlist, suggesting that individuals with higher levels of compassion were less likely
to reenlist. Only officers and those who had previously reenlisted were likely to continue serving
at statistically significant levels. When the institutional, occupational, and monetary dimensions
were applied to the reenlistment question, their assessment did not provide much clarity on their
explanatory power. However, in another test, the authors replaced the four dimensions of PSM
with the institutional model and found the self-sacrifice dimension was primarily being satisfied
through the decision to reenlist. Again, compassion was negatively correlated with reenlistment,
while the other two dimensions were insignificant. Based on these findings, they concluded that
the desire to give of themselves was the motivating factor in continuing to serve in uniform.
When compared to other PSM studies, there appears to be a distinction between serving in a
civilian public institution and the military. It is worth noting that the sample used by Taylor et al.
consisted exclusively of Special Forces Soldiers who are considered the most elite force in the
Army. No females were surveyed, and all these men were serving on active duty. Therefore, we
cannot conclude that these results will represent the entirety of the Army. The authors pointed
this out in the conclusions and called for more research on both the population and the
methodologies employed.
In another research study, the same research team examined motivations for joining the
military among college students enrolled in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program
at the University of Toledo in Michigan (2014). Using the same survey instrument as their
previous study, the authors compared the results between 290 undergraduate students at the
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university to 140 ROTC cadets during the fall semester of the 2011-2012 academic school year
and found that the institutional motivators for enlistment correlate positively with the rational,
normative, and affective dimensions of PSM. In addition, they found increases in the
Occupational motivator and the compassion PSM dimension reduced the likelihood of being an
ROTC cadet whereas the Institutional motivator and the self-sacrifice PSM dimension were
positively related to being an ROTC cadet. This study included more demographics than their
original study, such as females, with their sample coming from among people who had not yet
entered military service.
Section 2.6 Critiques of PSM
Despite the vast amount of research conducted about PSM over the last thirty years, the
theory is not without some weaknesses. Several authors have identified deficiencies in the
theory, with Bozeman & Su (2014) encapsulating them in a well-rounded synopsis of the various
critiques put forth by proponents and skeptics over the years. Using the framework developed by
Gerring (1999) that identified several criteria that must be present for a concept to be considered
both valid and reliable, the authors put PSM to the test and pinpointed several areas where the
theory falls short. According to Gerring, all social science concepts must conform to a
standardized set of 8 criteria – familiarity, resonance, parsimony, coherence, differentiation,
depth, theoretical utility, and field utility. After running PSM through the gauntlet of criteria,
they concluded that the theory scored relatively high on several of them; nonetheless, the
benchmarks it failed to reach were significant. The field of study on PSM has thus far been
unable to differentiate between PSM and altruism. This is largely seen through the multitude of
definitions and descriptions throughout the literature. Despite Perry & Wise (1990) explicitly
defining the term in their article, there have been marked distinctions in how the term was
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defined by subsequent authors. This lack of differentiation sets off a chain reaction that makes it
incapable of meeting other criteria, particularly coherence, parsimony, and theoretical utility.
Bozeman & Su (2015) point out that without the ability to differentiate PSM from other terms,
there cannot be a sufficient level of coherence (internal consistency). Without coherence,
parsimony (a stringent list of defining attributes) cannot be established, and without parsimony,
its theoretical utility (the ability to apply the theory to broader groups) will be insufficient (p.
704-705).
In terms of its field utility, Bozeman & Su also considered the theory suspect, primarily
because of the incongruence of terminology and application. PSM has been used largely as an
independent variable, while some like Moynihan & Pandey (2007) have attempted to uncover the
causes of PSM. Yet, there are still several unanswered questions about what causes PSM and
why some people have more of it than others. Similarly, there is a lack of clarity in its
relationship to intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation. Some scholars have explicitly connected
PSM and intrinsic motivation (Crewson, 1995; 1997), with others downplaying the relationship
in favor of the commitment to the institutional values (Vandenabeele, 2007; Perry, Hondeghem,
& Wise, 2010). Bozeman & Su also note the lack of clarity on what constitutes “public” or
“service.” Some will use the term synonymously to refer to citizens, clients, or any work
performed within a government department or agency. Others may lump forms of nonprofit or
volunteer work into this category. The authors did not diminish or downplay these types of
activities; rather, they simply acknowledge that not everyone agrees on the universality of these
oft-used terms. Bozeman & Su suggest a positive way forward for PSM would be to address the
inconsistencies about the definitions of key terms within the theory; clearly delineating it from
other concepts. Once this is done, it will enhance the theoretical and field utility of the theory
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moving forward. They asserted that PSM should be treated as both an independent and
dependent variable, as there is still no clear answer to its origins. If PSM is to persist as a
dominant theory, they argued, it must be refined and then tested in ways that expand its
application to the field of behavioral sciences.
Despite the merited arguments made by these authors, a valid counterpoint to criticisms
of PSM is the tendency to caricaturize the theory as overly altruistic. In fairness, PSM’s primary
purpose was to push back against the “rational man” that dominated much of the literature in
political science. Perry and Wise (1990) simply argued that rational motives were only part of
the decision-making equation, not the whole. Hence, it is unfair to accuse them of pushing the
pendulum of motivational thought to the other extreme only because they argued for the
inclusion of normative and affective dimensions. The authors just believed that a better theory
was needed to fill the gaps in knowledge left by rational choice theory.
Section 2.7 Conclusion
Motivation theory, as a field of study, has come a long way in the last 100 years. This
chapter provided a holistic review of the evolution of theoretical constructs that have permeated
the academic landscape. Within the broader field of social sciences, it has uncovered the
uniqueness of individuals in a variety of contexts. Within the narrower field of public
administration, it reveals distinctions between the sectors of employment and the types of people
who are drawn to public service. Despite much debate over how best to observe and assess the
characteristics that motivate a person to pursue a career in the public sector, most agree we still
have much to learn. In the following chapter, I specify the scope and methods for surveying a
diverse population within the Armed Forces that are currently pursuing post-secondary
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educational degrees to determine the merits of both the study conducted by Taylor et al. and the
general findings that other studies of PSM have unveiled.
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CHAPTER III
MILITARY SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES

Woven into the DNA of our country is the willingness by many to defend against the
threat of an external adversary. In fact, the state of Tennessee received its nickname as the
“Volunteer State” because its citizens overwhelmingly answered the call to defend the lower
Mississippi region during the War of 1812 (Kanon, 2014). Though the willingness to serve in
uniform is an integral part of what makes our country so great (Koppell, 2019), the reality is that
less than 1 percent of the American population is currently serving in the military and less than
10 percent of the population is made of up veterans (Schaeffer, 2021). Hence, a deeper look at
who joins the military is needed to better understand why they join.
This chapter will provide an overview of the current military population in the United
State. More specifically, this chapter will answer four important questions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

What is the current structure of the United State military?
Who is currently serving in the military?
How long are people serving in the military?
What are some educational benefits that veterans receive for their service?

Fidelity is needed on the first question to determine if the observed sample for this study is
representative of the entire military population. Likewise, longevity of service in the military has
unique federal and/or state restrictions not imposed on other spheres of public service. Thus, a
review of how long servicemembers are required and/or allowed to serve will add clarity to the
data collected from the observed population. Finally, it is widely known that financial assistance
is a popular benefit awarded to veterans in return for their service. Depending on the length of
military service, veterans are eligible for one or more programs that cover post-secondary
educational expenses, including tuition and fees, books, and even a housing allowance stipend.
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These opportunities are important in this study because they provide opportunities for
servicemembers to receive educational degrees that can be used in either the public or private
sector.
Section 3.1 Current Structure of the U.S. Military
The Armed Forces of the United States currently exist to support and defend the country
from foreign and domestic enemies. This is accomplished by providing air, land, and sea
capabilities from both an offensive and defensive posture. It has come a long way since our
country’s founding. Upon being appointed the first Secretary of War by George Washington,
Henry Knox started with just a small standing Army and handled some Naval affairs until the
Navy Department was created in 1798 (Callahan, 1994). This remained relatively unchanged
until the end of World War II when President Harry Truman signed the National Security Act of
1947, which created a National Military Establishment and James Forrestal became the first
Secretary of Defense after being confirmed by the Senate. This new military structure
consolidated the existing military branches and separated the Air Force from the Army, thus
creating a fourth military department. Two years later, in 1949, Congress passed an amendment
to the National Security Act, changing the name of the National Military Establishment to the
Department of Defense (Rearden, 2002; Bolton, 2008). While the Coast Guard is often viewed as
a separate military branch, this department has never operated within the Department of Defense.
Rather, since its creation in 1915, it has operated under two different cabinet-level departments
(Department of Treasury from 1967-2002; Department of Homeland Security from 2002Present). Since Coast Guard veterans are eligible for the same benefits as those from the other
military branches, they have been included in this study despite not falling under the Department
of Defense.

63

Each military branch possesses a unique role within the overall function of the Defense
Department’s mission, although there are some areas where overlap occurs. For instance, both
the Army and the Marine Corps are responsible for conducting ground operations and both the
Air Force and the Navy conduct aerial combat operations. However, their differences lie
primarily in the means through which they are employed. Traditionally, the Army has been
responsible for overseeing post-war and peacetime operations (Kingseed, 1992; Amara, 2012),
whereas the Air Force is primarily responsible for air-to-air combat, as compared to the Navy’s
role of aerial bombing and dogfighting (Kirkliauskaite, 2020). In short, the primary
responsibility of each branch is separate and distinction; yet, accomplishing this mission does
require duplicative capabilities in specialized areas.
Section 3.1.1 Military Components
As previously mentioned, there are multiple components within each branch of the
military. Each branch has an active-duty component consisting of full-time servicemembers.
These individuals perform their duties daily for the military in the same way a civil servant does
for a civilian department or agency. Each branch also has a reserve component made up of
individuals who perform duties less frequently but must adhere to most, if not all, readiness
requirements. In other words, these servicemembers must be ready to supplement active-duty
forces should the need arise. These functions consist exclusively of non-combat related duties,
including logistics, healthcare, finance and administration, information gathering and analysis,
and legal and religious services. Similarly, the Army and Air Force also maintain National Guard
components that have responsibilities akin to the Coast Guard’s (support and defend the
homeland) but may also supplement active-duty forces abroad like the Reserve components.
Each state has both Army and Air National Guard units that serve under gubernatorial
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leadership. Army National Guard units consist of both combat and non-combat occupational
specialties and may be called upon to perform humanitarian assistance duties at home or abroad.
For example, the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, based in Tennessee, has been mobilized to
support the Global War on Terror via Operation Iraqi Freedom III and they regularly send
battalions to Europe in support of Operational Atlantic Resolve (Haas, 2017). Table 3.1
(Appendix J) provides a breakdown of the different components within each branch of service
according to data published in May 2021 (DoD, 2021). As can be seen by the numbers below,
the National Guard component greatly increased the end strength of both the Air Force and
Army.
Section 3.1.2 Military Rank Structure
The rank structure for all branches of the military is broken down into three primary
categories: enlisted, warrant officers, and officers. Enlisted servicemember ranks range from E-1
to E-9 and, depending on the branch, can have multiple roles within certain ranks. For example,
an E-4 in the Army can either be a Specialist or a Corporal. In this case, the only distinction
regards the level of responsibility. Similarly, all branches have multiple roles of responsibility at
the rank of E-9; however, the title and roles in each branch will be distinct. Terms and symbols
for enlisted servicemembers are unique to each branch, except for the Navy and Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard, which was created after the U.S. Navy, adopted the latter’s rank and command
structure since their overall functions are closely aligned. Individuals that achieve the rank of E-5
are largely considered non-commissioned officers (NCO) and serve in supervisory roles
throughout their service. Junior NCOs hold the ranks of E-5 and E-6, while senior NCOs hold
the grade of E-7 and above. As previously stated, roles and responsibilities will depend on the
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branch of service but in all cases, NCOs serve as overseers of daily operations within each
command structure.
The second category within the military is the warrant officer corps. These
servicemembers primarily come from the enlisted ranks and receive commissions like the officer
corps, yet the pre-requisite requirements are different. Warrant officers are primarily considered
subject matter experts and can provide oversight, counsel, and leadership in areas directly
relevant to their discipline or field. Unlike the enlisted rank structure, warrant officers only have
five levels (WO-1 through WO-5). Moreover, roles and responsibilities will differ based on their
military occupational field and branch of service.
Finally, each branch has an officer corps, ranging from O-1 to O-10. These individuals
are required to possess a baccalaureate degree before receiving their commissions or, in some
cases, shortly thereafter. For instance, the Army will authorize commissions to individuals that
have completed 90 hours of college credit, but they must complete their degree within a specified
time to retain their commission. Much like the other two rank systems, officers have specified
occupational fields to which they are assigned. However, whereas enlisted servicemembers are
primarily responsible for oversight in one military occupational specialty, officers can and
usually do oversee multiple MOS’s at one time. What is more, officers can develop certain areas
of concentration (AOC) on top of their primary branch, and this allows them to pursue jobs that
require a special skill set. All the branches use the same symbols to differentiate the ranks;
however, the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps use the same terminology, with the Navy and
Coast Guard sharing terminology just like their enlisted structure. For example, an O-4 is called
a Major whether in the Air Force, Army, or Marine Corps but is called a Lieutenant Commander
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in the Navy and Coast Guard. Within the U.S. military, the officer corps (i.e., commissioned and
warrant officers) make up only 17.2% (DoD, 2021).
Section 3.1.2 Military Occupational Categories
Due to the nature of their work, each military branch has a somewhat unique structure of
military occupations, which are mainly broken down into different categories and dependent
upon rank. For example, the Army is broken into four specific branches of service: combat arms,
combat support, combat service support, and special services. Combat-arms military
occupational specialties (MOS) focus primarily on engaging forces during combat operations at
both the officer and enlisted levels, whereas combat support and combat service support are
responsible for enabling combat arms branches with the resources necessary to complete their
missions. Similarly, the Marine Corps has its own set of occupational specialties that focus
exclusively on combat operations, but their MOS categories are broken down by air, land, and
logistics. However, unlike the Marine Corps, the Army also has several military occupational
specialties that focus on the provision of medical services, which is something the Marine Corps
relies on the Navy to provide. The Marine Corps also have MOS opportunities in air and sea
support that are unavailable in the Army. In a similar manner, the Navy and Coast Guard share
many similar occupational specialties, with the notable exception of combat-related positions
being unavailable in the Coast Guard. MOS codes will vary depending on rank, as some
specialties are specific to officers. Appendix K provides a list of all MOS categories within each
branch of service. Each branch of service has very similar support roles – such as logistics,
medical, finance, administration, chaplaincy – and there are several branch-specific jobs that
focus on the specific responsibilities given to each branch by Congressional legislation.
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Section 3.2 Key Demographics of U.S. Military
Voluntary military service among portions of the American populace has been a constant
throughout our nation’s history but it is naïve to assume that all military service has been
voluntary. As mentioned in the previous chapter, conscription – the process of involuntarily
drafting men into military service – was regularly employed during periods of war until it was
ended in 1973. With the advent of an all-volunteer military, as well as specific requirements and
restrictions on those who are allowed to serve in uniform, the American military has undergone
multiple stages of growth over the last 50 years. For example, in 1974 the military end strength
was at just over 2.16 million and decreased by over 140,000 by the end of 1979. However, the
numbers steadily increased over the next several years to 2.17 million in 1987 before getting
reduced to 2.07 million in 1988. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, forces
steadily decreased and by the end of the 20th century, the American military was down to just
1.38 million active-duty servicemembers, with another 906,000 serving in a reserve component.
End strength numbers even lowered after the 9/11 terrorist attacks to 2.68 million, before rising
to 2.31 million after the declaration by Congress to use force against Iraq and remove Saddam
Hussein from power. Since that time, end strength has fluctuated between 2.07 and 2.28 million
(DoD, 2021; Congressional Research Service, 2021).
Section 3.2.1 Gender differences in the Military
At the end of conscription, only 2% of enlisted forces and 8% of officers were females.
By 2021, they made up almost 17% and 19% respectively of both active and reserve
components. As of May 2021, the Navy and Air Force have the highest percentages of women
serving in their ranks, with the Army having the highest total number. On active duty, the ratio of
female officers to enlisted is 4.7 to 1, with the difference in the reserve holding at 5 to 1.
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Regardless of these strides, males still make up most of all military branches on both active duty
(83%) and the reserves (79%) (DoD, 2021).
Concerning the different military occupational specialties, females have only been
authorized to serve in combat support or combat service support positions. However, in 2015 the
ban on serving in combat arms roles was lifted and women have been serving alongside men
since January 2016. While this issue is relegated only to the Army and Marine Corps, there are
roles within the other branches that have traditionally been exclusive to males. As of 2018,
women made up approximately 4.35% of infantry, gun crews, and seamanship, as compared to
the 13.33% of males in the same positions. However, women have tended to outnumber men in
the medical, administrative, and supply occupational categories (Patten & Parker, 2011; Moore,
2020). Regardless of the military branch, these positions are considered supporting roles within
the overall operational environment, which has been the primary means of service for women in
the Armed Forces.
Section 3.2.2 Age Differences in the Military
Before delving into the breakdown of the U.S. military by age, it should be noted that
there are specific age requirements that limit when an individual can begin serving, as well as
how long he or she can serve. The traditional mandate for when an individual can begin serving
is 18 years old; however, those who are 17 years of age can enlist with written approval from a
legal guardian. Each branch also has a cutoff age upon which to join, with the Marine Corps
having the earliest cutoff age of 28 and the Air Force and Coast Guard allowing people as old as
39 to join their ranks. In addition, the mandatory retirement date (MRD) is established for every
servicemember based on years of service, age, and/or rank. For example, all branches authorize
retirement with certain benefits to all servicemembers after 20 years of service; yet this does not
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mean they are required to retire upon completion of their 20th year. Rather, they are issued an
MRD after 28 to 30 years of service, depending on their age and rank. General officers are
usually granted a few more years of service if holding positions of senior leadership.
Based on numbers reported in 2019, 45.7% of active-duty servicemembers and 32.8% of
reservists were under the age of 26. This is not surprising since most individuals tend to join
earlier in their lives. The overall totals decline by roughly 50% within each subsequent age
group, with only 103,639 of the 1.326 million active-duty servicemembers being over the age of
41 and 155,540 in the reserve components (DoD 2019). The largest disparity of age can be seen
between officers and enlisted, as officers over the age of 45 make up at least 15% of each branch
of service, as compared to less than 5% of enlisted personnel (Council on Foreign Relations,
2020).
Section 3.2.3 Race and Ethnicity Differences in the Military
According to data from the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2019 60.1% of Americans were
white, non-Hispanic; yet this demographic made up over 70% of the entire military during that
same year. Regarding the other categories of race, African Americans made up 12.2% of the
entire population but represent 16.9% of the military. Conversely, 5.6% of the population in
America are Asian but represent only 4.6% of the military, with the remaining racial categories
making up 3.7% of the country but 8.7% of the military. Taken together, the ethnic breakdown of
Hispanics to non-Hispanics in America is 18% to 82% respectively. However, that disparity is
greater in the military, as 84.5% of the military is non-Hispanic (Ghosh, 2021; DoD, 2020).
When breaking down race and ethnicity by rank within the military, the disparity is even
greater. For instance, White officers make up 76.1% of the active-duty component and 79% of
the reserve component. Regarding racial minorities, the ratio of enlisted to officers is 6.5 to 1
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across all military branches (DoD, 2020). Based on the above numbers, as well as those reported
in the section on gender, minority females make up a very small percentage of the military and
an even small percentage of the officer corps, even though women make up more than 50% of
the population in this country and those of color represent over 20% (Frey, 2020).
Section 3.2.4 Average Length of Service in the Military
Every individual that joins any branch of service is required to fulfill a military service
obligation of at least 8 years of service, though how these years are served will vary. For
example, if an individual elects to serve on active duty, he or she will have to serve at least 3
years in that component before being eligible to change to a reserve component. Those who join
a reserve component must serve at least 6 years with a unit that performs monthly battle
assemblies (BA) before changing to an inactive status for their final two years. The only
exceptions granted for an honorable discharge are generally related to a medical condition that
precludes the servicemember from performing normal duties and responsibilities. As a result,
they receive a medical discharge that nullifies all military service obligations not completed.
The average length of service for service members has ebbed and flowed over the last
several decades, largely due to combat operations and military engagements. For instance, the
enlisted personnel rose from 5.8 years in 1973 during the waning years of Vietnam to a peak of
7.5 in 1994 and 1996 but then began drifting downward to 6.7 years in 2011 (Pew Research
Center, 2011). Based on recent data, an average of 25% of active-duty personnel and 14% of
reservists retire each year, with the remainder either being voluntarily discharged from service
upon completion of the service contract or transitioning to a reserve unit. Changes to the size of
the overall force have led to an increase in the number of involuntary separations, which
accounted for 30% of personnel losses in 2019 (DoD, 2020).
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Finally, some servicemembers can be released from their military service obligation for
several reasons, ranging from medical disabilities that prevent them from carrying out their
normal duties to legal or administrative separations due to behavior. In 2019 alone 15,616
servicemembers were discharged due to medical or disability reasons. During that same year,
9,846 were discharged due to legal issues or poor standards of conduct (DoD, 2020). This is
worth noting because these individuals are generally barred from reenlistment even if they can
maintain veteran status and some of the associated benefits.
Section 3. 3 Educational Benefits for Servicemembers
Educational funding for veterans is a concept that dates back to the Civil War. Illiterate
African American soldiers in the Union army were given the opportunity of receiving
nonmilitary education to expand their effectiveness both on and off the battlefield. Prior to and
during World War I, noncommissioned officers were allowed to suspend their military service to
receive educational training at nearby institutions of higher learning so they could use their
educations to enhance the quality and effectiveness of the Armed forces. Although it was done
on a very limited basis before World War II, the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, passed
less than a month after the Allied Forces stormed the beaches of Normandy on D-Day, granted
all servicemembers funding by the federal government to pursue degrees in higher education.
American Legion publicist Jack Cejnar originally referred to it as the "GI Bill of Rights," leading
to the common reference of the educational benefits that came out of this Act being called the GI
Bill. Shortly thereafter, the Department of the Army enacted a policy allowing Soldiers to
receive financial assistance to pursue non-military educational opportunities during their off-duty
hours (Mettler, 2005). This was mimicked by the other services and it has largely remained
intact, despite being modified and amended a couple of times over the last several decades. Other
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programs, such as the Veterans Educational Assistance Program (VEAP), have been created to
provide additional revenue streams for servicemembers to pursue military education; however,
these are much smaller, both in terms of funding and participation (Eitelberg, 2016).
In 1984, Mississippi Congressman Gillespie V. "Sonny" Montgomery sought to revamp
the GI Bill in a way that required eligible participants to pay a portion of their salary into the
program to receive the totality of the benefits program. This statute remained largely untouched
until 2009 when a new educational benefits program was created as an alternative to the
Montgomery Bill. Under chapter 33 of U.S. Code 38, the Post 9/11 GI Bill was created in 2008
and expanded eligibility and financial assistance allocations to better care for the overall needs of
servicemembers and their dependents while pursuing a non-military education. For instance, the
Post 9/11 program does not require servicemembers to pay a portion of their salaries into the
program, and eligibility is based on the amount of time served on active duty.
Unlike the Montgomery GI Bill, Post 9/11 participants are eligible to use benefits as soon
as they complete 90 days of active service. Even if they do not complete 3 years of service, they
are still able to receive a percentage of the benefits depending on the amount of time served. In
2017, the Forever GI Bill amendment removed the 15-year time limit restriction and expanded
other benefit allotments, such as Basic Housing Allowance and work-study opportunities.
Coupled with the continued provision of educational benefits under DoD's Tuition Assistance
Program, the educational opportunities for servicemen and women are easier to obtain than ever
before. This allows individuals from all different walks of life and socioeconomic classes to
pursue post-secondary degrees with little to no student loan debt upon completion of initial
military service requirements consisting of 90 days on active duty.
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Section 3.3.1 VA vs. DoD Educational Assistance
Depending on an individual's time in service, a DoD employee is eligible to receive a
portion of GI Bill benefits. This program is open to all servicemembers that have served at some
point in the past but are no longer serving in the Armed Forces. Current and former
servicemembers that choose not to use their GI Bill entitlements can elect to transfer them to one
of their dependents. In short, current servicemembers can have access to both tuition assistance
benefits and the GI Bill; however, those who are no longer serving are only eligible for the GI
Bill. On the other hand, if an individual is currently serving and is pursuing a post-secondary
degree approved by their chain of command, they are entitled to receive financial support from
the DoD Tuition Assistance Program. This program pays up to $250 per credit hour or a total of
$4,500 per academic year for tuition. In some cases, current servicemembers will elect to use GI
Bill benefits, as this program pays significantly more towards tuition than the DoD program. The
GI Bill also pays a housing allowance stipend to full-time students, along with a yearly book
stipend of $1,000.
When referencing servicemembers for the remainder of this paper, I will include all
current and former servicemembers, as well as those dependents who are using the Post-9/11 GI
Bill benefits. Another important caveat of the TA program is the limitation placed on degree
types. Whereas the GI Bill can be used for a variety of degree programs, TA can only be used to
pursue undergraduate or master’s level degrees. Using TA also carries with it an additional duty
service obligation. For instance, for every year of schooling that DoD helps pay for, the
servicemember is required to serve an additional two years in the military. If a servicemember
fails to fulfill this requirement, he or she is required to pay back the amount of tuition
commensurate with the years of service they did not complete.

74

Section 3.3.2 Educational Differences in the Military
Along with minimum age requirements, the military also requires individuals to have at
least a High School diploma or equivalent, or at least be within one year of completing this
degree, before enlisting. However, officers are required to have at least 90 hours of college credit
before receiving their commissions, and completion of their bachelors must occur within 36
months of taking their oath of office. According to most recent data, just over 65% of military
personnel have at least a High School diploma or some college credit, with only 15% report
having a bachelor’s degree. Only 8.2% reported having some form of an advanced degree;
however, it is worth pointing out that over 41% of active-duty officers and 39% of reserve
officers have an advanced degree. These numbers have increased over a roughly 10-year period,
as only 7.3% of active-duty enlisted servicemembers reported having an associate degree in
2010. By 2019, that number had increased to 10.5% (DoD, 2020).
Active-duty servicemembers are more likely to reach the threshold for receiving 100% of
their GI Bill benefits due to their service commitment. The number of National Guard and
Reserve servicemembers has steadily increased, in large part due to the need for these forces to
augment or supplement active-duty forces in wartime environments. Whenever a servicemember
is activated for a deployment, they accrue the same number of active-duty days as their
counterparts in the active component. This enables them to accrue active-duty days quicker than
they would just performing the standard 14 days of annual training in the reserve component.
Based on 2019 data, roughly 80% of all National Guard and Reserve forces are currently eligible
for 100% of their GI Bill benefits and at the time of this writing, 505,000 servicemembers were
utilizing their benefits to attend higher education institutions (Congressional Budget Office,
2019).
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Section 3.4 Conclusion
The American military is often referred to as a melting pot of diversity, representing
virtually every segment of society writ large. This may be the case to a certain extent but there
are definite exceptions to this rule. Women are grossly underrepresented and there are also fewer
minorities in the military compared to the overall population. Despite being the fastest group
ethnic group in our country, Hispanics are still underrepresented in the military (Rodriguez,
2020). Based on the above data, one could deduce that the most common individual serving in
the military is a white male under the age of 26 who has just over a high school education. This
person is likely coming from one of the lowest socioeconomic income levels (Council on
Foreign Relations, 2020). In the following chapter, the focus will turn towards the observed
population of veterans pursuing a post-secondary education to determine if the sample of
students provides an adequate representation of the total military force and their willingness to
continue serving in uniform.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA AND METHODS

The present study aims to determine if individuals that join the American military do so
for extrinsic (desire to perform certain jobs) or intrinsic (sense of duty and selfless service)
reasons. Such a pursuit requires collecting new data to advance the existing body of knowledge
on the subject. This chapter details the methods through which data was collected and analyzed
from veterans of the American military that are currently pursuing post-secondary educational
degrees at multiple institutions from across the country. The following section describes the
process through which data was collected, as well as the methods used to analyze the variables of
focus for this study. As previously mentioned, this study primarily mimics the work of both
Ngaruiya et al. and Taylor et al. (2015). It also considers the great diversity within the observed
population. This includes utilizing the same instrument tool and means of analysis to examine
the data collected throughout the summer and early fall of 2021.
Section 4.1 Survey Instrument
Chapter 1 of this study provides a brief description of the survey instrument that was
created for this study. This section provides more detail on both the structure and contents of the
survey. As previously stated, the survey was a modified version of the one used in both the
Ngaruiya et al. (2014) and Taylor et al. (2015) studies. The survey used in these studies was a
combination of the tool created by Kim et al. (2013) that established a Likert scale for measuring
the four dimensions of public service motivation theory (see Appendix M), as well as a Likert
scale adopted by Woodruff et al. (2006) for measuring the two dimensions of Moskos’ I-O
model. The first section of the survey consists of 20 separate questions regarding public service
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using the Likert Scale, while the second section has 13 questions about military service using the
same Likert Scale.
The final section of the survey consists of 29 questions related to individual
demographics, military service, educational pursuits, and other characteristics that might contain
some explanatory power of interest to this study. For instance, respondents were asked to provide
general demographic information like age, race, gender, marital status, political leanings and
partisan affiliation, birthplace, and citizenship. They were also asked specific questions about
their military service, including branch, rank, component, MOS, years of service, and whether
they had any family member that also served. Regarding their educational pursuits, respondents
were asked to identify the level of degree they are currently pursuing, intended major, and what
(if any) military-related educational benefits they are using to pay for their schooling. Finally,
respondents were asked to disclose if they were currently working, which employment sector
they worked in, and whether they were interested in pursuing a career in the public sector.
Section 4.2 Data Collection
Section 4.2.1 Data Sources
Student-veterans from 12 different post-secondary institutions in seven different states
were asked to complete the survey. These states were not chosen for any specific reason, other
than the ability to connect with individual representatives at each institution. In some cases, I
was put in contact with specific individuals by a friend and colleague. In others, I did an online
search of the institution and emailed the representatives directly. Five of the institutions were 2year community colleges, four were state universities, and 3 were private universities (Columbia,
Chicago, and Notre Dame). All the participating universities had both undergraduate and
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postgraduate degree programs. Table 4.1 (Appendix L) provides the list of higher educational
institutions that participated in the study.
Section 4.2.2 Data Collection
The process by which data was collected for this study consisted of contacting
representatives that focus exclusively on supporting veterans at each institution. Some of these
departments may take on different responsibilities but the personnel within these departments
and offices have a direct line of communication with veterans at their schools. More specifically,
because representatives from each institution had the ability to email student-veterans, they were
asked to solicit the participation of student-veterans through direct email correspondence. Direct
emails from the veterans’ representatives to the student-veterans wer the primary method of
solicitation used for collecting data. In short, once approval between the host institution and the
participating institution for this study, veterans’ representatives were provided with a general
solicitation email detailing the purpose of the study and a formal request for student-veterans to
complete an online version of the survey.
A digital version of the survey was created using Microsoft Forms and veterans at the
participating institutions were given a link to complete the survey at their leisure. The survey
could be completed anonymously, as there was no requirement to provide any personally
identifiable information before or after completion of the survey. Student-veterans were not
required to provide the name of the institution they were attending, as they were only asked
which degree level they were currently pursuing. It is possible to determine whether respondents
were at community colleges versus universities based on the degree level, but there was no
feasible way of determining which specific institutions they were attending since they only
disclosed the locations of their place of birth, and in which state they were living when they first
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joined the military. Since the implementation of the Higher Education Opportunity Act in 2015,
veterans (to include dependents) can only be charged in-state tuition rates at public colleges and
universities. The legislation gives veterans, even if not a citizen of a state, unofficial residency
for the purpose of paying in-state tuition rates at any public institution to which they are
admitted. This is important to note regarding anonymity because there is no way to determine if
a respondent attended a school in the same state where they enlisted. While this is possible and
even likely, it does not mean that all individuals who enlisted in the state of Tennessee are
currently attending a public institution in the state. This same rationale goes for every other state
and even for the private institutions that participated.
Responses to the survey were collected between June 22, 2021, and September 25, 2021.
Once I was permitted to collect data from a participating institution and the solicitation email
was sent to veterans’ representatives, they decided when and how to contact student-veterans at
their institutions. Except for Columbia University (who published the solicitation email in a
digital newsletter to student-veterans), a representative from the veterans’ services office at each
institution sent one to four emails to their list of student-veterans asking them to complete the
survey. As a point of emphasis, I did not have direct contact with any of the respondents of this
survey. All communication went directly through each institution’s veterans’ services office.
Section 4.3 Variables
Section 4.3.1 Independent Variables
As previously addressed in Chapter 2, there are strong linkages between the Institutional
motivators identified by Mokos (1970) and the normative, affective, and rational dimensions
created by Perry & Wise (1990). More specifically, the very thoughts and emotions that motivate
someone to serve according to the PSM dimensions are likely to be the same thoughts and
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emotions that motivate them to serve according to the Institutional motivators. To mimic the two
studies that serve as a launching point for this study, I have adopted the same independent
variables and will use the four dimensions of PSM - commitment to public values (CPV),
attraction to public service (APS), self-sacrifice (SS), and compassion (COM) - to determine if
they are positively correlated with the institutional motivators of military service. Finally,
institutional motivations will serve as an independent variable to see if there are correlations
between this variable and those of PSM. Each of these will be examined considering the
dependent variable being used.
Section 4.3.2 Dependent Variable
The independent variables will remain the same, with a slight difference in the dependent
variable, largely due to the differences in the observed population. For instance, Taylor et al.
sought to determine if PSM explained reenlistment among respondents; however, most of the
individuals I surveyed have already left the military. So, I chose to replace reenlistment with
continued service in the public sector, mainly because this variable is still applicable to the
notion of public service motivations, especially since more individuals will be pursuing a degree
that is directly relevant to their career ambitions. Granted, some individuals will use their degrees
to further their existing careers in the military. Similarly, others may seek a degree that allows
them to continue to serve in another public sector capacity aside from the military. They might
even serve as a civilian employee within one of the military branches. By using this dependent
variable, the current study has some direct relevance to much of the extant literature on PSM, as
those have also looked at the levels of each dimension among public sector employees.
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Section 4.3.1 Control Variables
Both studies provided control variables in the regression analyses that were distinct to
their observed populations. Ngaruiya et al. included race, gender, and religious affiliation as
control variables. Except for religious affiliation (which was not included in this study), I will
also include these as dichotomous variables in the study. I will distinguish between Whites (0)
and non-whites (1) to determine any differences between race and public service. Furthermore, I
will control for gender by distinguishing between males (0) and females (1). Taylor et al., on the
other hand, did not include gender since their sample was almost exclusively men but they did
use race alongside rank, marital status, and prior reenlistment. This meant enlisted, not married,
no previous reenlistment, and white were the reference categories for their control variables (p.
149). I will be drawing from this study only the dichotomous control of enlisted (0) and officer
(1) since marital status and previous reenlistment do not have much explanatory power for
determining one’s desire to continue working in the public sector. In sum, race, gender, and rank
will be the three control variables for this study.2
One more control variable that I will be using for this study that did not apply to the
previous studies is the military occupational specialty of everyone. Again, the limitation to the
Ngaruiya et al. study was that none of the ROTC cadets had been serving in a specific
occupational branch and those surveyed by Taylor et al. were all in the Special Forces branch.
While they could have had different jobs and responsibilities, these positions were still within the
18 series ascribed to Special Forces, meaning they are all in a combat arms branch of the Army.
Because I am surveying members of each branch of service, I have a broader sample of

2

To ensure all of the control variables were able to be dichotomized, 6 cases were moved. One was removed
because “Gender Diverse” was chosen for gender and 5 respondents chose “Prefer Not to Answer” when asked to
disclose their race/ethnicity. The remaining observations provided responses that were sufficient for dichotomizing
each of these control variables.
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servicemembers that will include non-combat arms positions. Therefore, my final control
variable will be dichotomized into two non-combat arms (0) and combat arms (1). This variable
will allow me to compare whether individuals serving in a combat arms position have different
levels of PSM or institutional motivators to their non-combat arms counterparts in each branch of
service.
Section 4.4 Research Hypotheses
Since the current study is not the same as Ngaruiya et al. (2014) or Taylor et al. (2015),
there are some differences in my research hypotheses. First, Ngaruiya et al. focused only on one
of the PSM dimensions (CPV), and Taylor et al. focused on all four concerning the Institutional
motivations of the I-O model. Since I want to focus on observing the relationship between all the
PSM dimensions, I have adopted Taylor et al.’s first hypothesis set:
Hypothesis 1: Each of the four PSM dimensions is positively correlated with institutional
motivation.
•

Hypothesis 1a: The Commitment to Public Values dimension of PSM is
positively correlated with institutional motivation.

•

Hypothesis 1b: The Attraction to Public Service dimension of PSM is
positively correlated with institutional motivation.

•

Hypothesis 1c: The Self-Sacrifice dimension of PSM is positively
correlated with institutional motivation.

•

Hypothesis 1d: The Compassion dimension of PSM is positively
correlated with institutional motivation.

Second Ngaruiya et al. conducted a comparative study between undergraduate students
and ROTC cadets at a single institution, whereas this study is simply looking at one specific
population (student-veterans pursuing post-secondary degrees). Since my population shares the
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educational environment with respondents in that study, I have adopted Hypothesis 2 and will
compare the means of the ROTC Cadets and undergraduate students at the University of Toledo
to student-veterans surveyed for this study. Hence, I have chosen to mimic Hypothesis 2 in the
Ngaruiya et al. study, where they assumed the CPV would be higher in ROTC Cadets than in the
regular undergraduate students (p. 446). In the same way that the authors felt this dimension of
PSM would be higher in those willing to serve in the military, I assume that it would also be
higher in those individuals that have already served in the military. Moreover, since studentveterans have already served in the military and the ROTC cadets surveyed in the study had not
yet begun their official military service, I have included an additional sub-hypothesis to compare
these two groups. As previously mentioned, I did not survey ROTC cadets or individuals with no
military experience that are pursuing post-secondary educational degrees for this study. So, I will
be comparing my results with the ones provided in the Ngaruiya et al. study. So, I will be using
the following hypotheses to compare results to the Ngaruiya et al. study:
▪

Hypothesis 2a: CPV will be higher for student-veterans than for
undergraduate students.

▪

Hypothesis 2b: CPV will be higher for student-veterans than for ROTC
cadets.

This comparison could be an important step in determining if there are any differences in
PSM among individuals before they begin their military service obligation versus after they have
completed it. The results from this study can also be compared to the results found in Taylor et
al.’s study since the latter only surveyed individuals that were currently serving. In sum, one
important contribution of this study is the addition of data from “post-service” veterans to the
study of PSM and I-O dimensions.
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Finally, since my dependent variable is like the one used by Taylor et al., I have slightly
modified each sub-hypothesis to reflect the observed variable of intent to work in the public
sector. The following are my final set of research hypotheses for the sample of military personnel
for the four service branches:
Hypothesis 3: Each of the four PSM dimensions increases the probability of intent to
work in the public sector.
•

Hypothesis 2a: The Commitment to Public Values dimension of PSM
increases the probability of intent to work in the public sector.

•

Hypothesis 3b: The Attraction to Public Service dimension of PSM
increases the probability of intent to work in the public sector.

•

Hypothesis 3c: The Self-Sacrifice dimension of PSM increases the
probability of intent to work in the public sector.

•

Hypothesis 3d: The Compassion dimension of PSM increases the
probability of intent to work in the public sector.

Both Ngaruiya et al. and Taylor et al. found support for Hypotheses 1 in their analysis of
each data set. More specifically, Taylor et al. found that all four of the dimensions within PSM
correlated with the Institutional dimension of I-O. According to these results, it appears that PSM
helps enhance the understanding of how institutional motivations can predict why people join or
choose to stay in the military. However, as it relates to Hypothesis 2, the results were somewhat
mixed. Based on their results, the authors did not find statistically significant support for
Hypotheses 2a or 2b, except for some support for Hypotheses 2c and 2d. Instead, the authors
found that as the Self-Sacrifice dimension increases, respondents were more likely to choose to
reenlist; but, as the Compassion dimension increased, they were less likely to reenlist. In short,
the Soldiers surveyed were motivated to continue to serve out of a desire to give of themselves
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rather than to help others (Taylor et al., 2015). Similarly, Ngaruiya et al. (2014) did not find
support for Hypothesis 3 of their study, in which they expected a positive relationship between
CPV and ROTC service. Rather, they concluded that CPV was not related to this likelihood at all
(p. 451).
Section 4.4 Research Methods
The findings in the next chapter will be laid out in two stages. The first section will focus
on providing some descriptive analyses on the major demographics of the respondents. I will
provide a breakdown of the major categories pertinent to the observed population that was
addressed in Chapter 3, including gender, race, age, branch of service, component, rank, military
occupational specialty (MOS), and length of service, including number of deployments. I will
also address some additional attributes that are worthy of analysis, such as level of education,
degree program, primary reasons for joining the military, current employment, and whether they
had family members that had served. All these factors provide valuable information to better
understand the general veteran population, as well as provide clarity on how much the sample
represents the entire population. Finally, these descriptive variables can also enhance our
understanding of whether PSM and I-O dimensions tend to wax and wane or remain static over
time.
The second stage will focus on replicating the methods used by the previous studies and
then comparing the results of the present study to the other authors’ findings. To do this
effectively, the same methods of analysis had to be employed. However, it is also important to
note that the exact same methods were not used in both studies. For example, Ngaruiya et al.
used pairwise partial correlation to determine the relationship between PSM dimensions and I-O
factors, with Taylor et al. employing the Pearson correlation. Even though both studies consisted
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of the same researchers, the methods deviated because they used different methods in their
respective analyses. When observing ROTC Cadets, the team calculated the mean for each
dimension and compared them via pairwise but generated factor scores via a confirmatory factor
analysis when examining active servicemembers in the Army. To provide both an adequate and
accurate comparison, I am using both methods and comparing them accordingly. Regarding
Hypothesis 2, a series of multinomial logit models are used to test the primary and subhypotheses in the same manner as Taylor et al. They justified this method because they
trichotomized the dependent variable of reenlistment to leave the military, unsure, and renew
military commitment/reenlist (p. 148). The same dependent variable is not used in the present
study but continued service in the public sector is also trichotomized to yes, no, unsure. The
same multinomial logit models will be used for simplicity and to conduct a comparative analysis.
Finally, just as Ngaruiya et al. (2014) used an independent t samples test to determine the
differences in means of the CPV dimension of PSM between ROTC and undergraduate
respondents (p. 448), the same method will be used to examine Hypothesis 3a and 3b.
Section 4.5 Conclusion
Since the current study intends to compare the observed population of student-veterans
with those of Ngaruiya et al.’s observations of ROTC cadets and their undergraduate
counterparts, as well as the Special Forces soldiers surveyed in the Taylor et al.’s study, it seems
most appropriate to replicate their methods of analyses. Doing so will ensure that an adequate
comparison can be made among each population. What is more, this approach will hopefully
shed light on the legitimacy of each method and its use in future studies that seek to address
another population of servicemembers within the United States. Regardless of the results, more
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fidelity on this unique community of individuals is worth studying, as their commitment to
service is virtually unparalleled.
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CHAPTER V
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

Section 5.1 Descriptive Analysis
As previously stated, data was collected for this study between June 22 and September
25, 2021. At the completion of this period, 151 student-veterans had submitted survey responses.
Although some individuals did not provide answers to every single question on the survey, all of
them did respond to the questions that are of direct interest and pertinent to the theoretical
models being used. This section will break down the respondents based on important
demographics that will help determine how closely my sample reflects the current military
population, as described in Chapter 3. These include gender, race, age, branch of service,
component, rank, military occupational specialty (MOS), and length of service, including
number of deployments. I will also review some additional factors of interest to the issue of
retention in the military, as well as the study of veterans in higher education, like level of
education/degree program, primary reasons for joining the military, current employment, and
whether they had family members that had served. Each factor has the potential to help explain
initial motivations for joining the military and how to encourage individuals to continue their
military career upon completion of their military service obligation.
Section 5.1.1 Gender, Race, and Age
As of this year, males make up roughly 83% of current servicemembers across the
military branches (DoD, 2021). However, males make up only 67% of respondents for this
survey (see Figure 5.1 in Appendix N). While this disparity is a little more than negligible, it is
worth noting that having a larger portion of responses from females will add to what we know
about female servicemembers, especially since Taylor et al. (2015) did not survey any females
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for their study and only 27% of the ROTC cadets surveyed by Ngaruiya et al. (2014) were
females. These results might also be of interest in the study of whether gender plays a role in
online survey participation. Another important observation is that “Gender diverse” was
provided on the survey and one individual chose this option.
Regarding race, Figure 5.2 (Appendix O) shows that the overwhelming majority (72%) of
responses came from individuals that identified as White/Caucasian. Again, this is true for the
current population of servicemembers, as over 70% of current servicemembers identify as White
(Ghosh, 2021; DoD, 2020). The percentages for the minority categories are smaller than those
found in the military, but a surprising category that had a higher-than-expected response rate is
the number of individuals who self-identify with multiple races and/or ethnicities. 12
respondents chose this option, which is more than the combined total of African American,
Asian, and Native American respondents. This is a worthwhile observation because of the rise in
multi-race/multi-ethnic children being born in the United States. For example, in the year 2000,
roughly 10% of the American population was multiracial and multiethnic, up from only 5% in
1980 (Livingston, 2017), and it makes sense that the rise within the general population would
extend to the military as well. Finally, the number of Hispanic respondents made up roughly
11% of the sample, despite making up just over 18% of the total population in the military. In
sum, this sample provides a slightly higher average of Whites than the overall military
population and this accounts for the smaller representation of minorities.
Regarding age, the expectation was that the observed population would naturally be
higher than the average age among the overall population of servicemembers, primarily because
a large percentage of individuals choose to serve out their military contracts before attending
college. This is mainly due to the educational benefits they are eligible to receive upon
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completion of their initial service commitment. Hence, I assumed that the focus on veterans
pursuing post-secondary degrees would mean surveying individuals who had already served a
portion, if not all, of their military service obligation. Additionally, since I was surveying
student-veterans at state and prominent private institutions, I would receive a disproportionately
larger sample of older veterans who were returning to school to pursue a post-graduate degree.
This proved to be the case, as those ages 17-24 (14%) made up less than those age 45 and older
(15%). 45% of respondents were in the 25-34 age range, with the second-largest coming from
the 35-44 range (26%). Again, this is likely due to the number of individuals pursuing a postgraduate degree. Figure 5.3 (Appendix P) shows the breakdown of respondents by age; however,
I will breakdown respondents by degree level in a later subsection.
Section 5.1.2 Military Service Demographics
This section will provide a breakdown of respondents by their branch of service,
component, rank, and MOS, which can also be seen in Figure 5.4 (Appendix Q). These
characteristics are important in determining how diverse the sample is compared to previous
studies. Again, Taylor et al. only surveyed servicemembers in the Army, while Ngaruiya et al.
only looked at ROTC cadets from the Army and Air Force. This study intends to add to the body
of knowledge by looking at all military branches, including the Coast Guard. According to Table
3.1 (p. 67), the Army (55%) has the largest percentage of personnel, followed by the Air Force
(23%), Navy (12%), Marine Corps (5%), and Coast Guard (4%), respectively. In much the same
way that Whites outnumbered minorities in this sample, Army personnel greatly outnumbered its
sister branches. Respondents that served in the Army made up 65% and, somewhat surprisingly,
the Navy had the second-highest response rate at 23%. The Marine Corps was next at 17%,
followed by the Air Force was at 15%. Finally, only 2% of respondents were affiliated with the
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Coast Guard. Fortunately, each of the five branches was represented in this sample, which
provides some insight into motivations among these servicemembers where none previously
existed.
Arguably the greatest disparity between the military population and the current sample
comes in the breakdown by component (see Figure 5.5, Appendix R). As Table 3.1 shows, the
National Guard has the largest proportion of servicemembers (41%), despite only two branches
making up this component (Army and Air Force). Next, the Reserve component makes up 33%,
with the Active component making up 25%. However, based on respondents in this sample, 83%
are either currently serving or ended their time in service in the Active component. Only 11%
and 6% were from the National Guard or Reserve, respectively. It is worth noting at this point
that student-veterans were also asked on the survey which component they originally entered the
military through and the is a slight differential, as a few individuals started their military careers
either the Reserve or National Guard before transferring to the Active component. Despite the
more common move from Active to Reserve or National Guard, several individuals have seen
the benefits of making the military a full-time career after getting their start in a non-active
component.
If the biggest disparity between the sample and the population was found in the
components, arguably the greatest parity comes in the distribution of respondents by rank (see
Figure 5.6, Appendix S). As mentioned in Chapter 4, rank will serve as a control variable for this
study. So, instead of identifying each respondent by their most recent rank, I will dichotomize
them into either enlisted or officer. According to the Department of Defense reports from earlier
this year, roughly 17.2% of military personnel are officers, while the rest are enlisted. After
breaking down respondents into their respective categories, 16% were officers, and 84% were
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enlisted. An important observation to make is that at least one respondent was in every rank from
E-1 to E-8, leaving only the highest enlisted rank not being represented. However, several officer
and Chief Warrant officer ranks were not represented. Figure 5.6 provides shows the distribution
of officers to enlisted among those surveyed. Respondents were also asked to provide the
program through which they entered the military. Since the vast majority were enlisted, they all
entered by way of Basic Training (i.e., “boot camp”). The officers who responded went through
multiple programs, including ROTC, Military Academy, and Officer Candidate School (OCS),
but there were not enough responses among this demographic to derive enough valuable
information for this study.
The remaining data points related to military service that are worth mentioning pertain to
military occupational specialty (MOS), length of service, and number of deployments. It stands
to reason that the longer individuals served in the military, the more deployments they were
likely to fulfill. With the increased operational tempo of every military branch during the Global
War on Terror, especially on those branches of service with combat arms positions, one would
expect individuals serving in a combat-arms-related MOS to have more deployments than those
in a non-combat arms-related MOS. Since MOS is a control variable, it has been dichotomized
into either combat arms or non-combat arms. When this is done, the breakdown is similar to the
difference between officer and enlisted, with respondents in combat arms positions being the
minority at only 26 (17%). Upon closer inspection of these individuals, nine of those individuals
had at least seven years of service and seven of them had 10 or more years of service. Of the 26
individuals, nine of them did not have any deployments during their time in service, and the
remaining individuals had been deployed once or twice. These results do not seem abnormal
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since most combat arms servicemembers did not have as many years of service as their noncombat arms counterparts.
Of the 125 non-combat arms respondents, only 16 of them reported no military
deployments and only 5 of them had at least 7 years of service. The remainder of individuals
with at least 7 years of service (33) reported between 1-5 deployments. It is worth noting at this
juncture that the term deployment can consist of different amounts of time in a combat zone,
depending on the branch of service. For instance, during the height of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Army Soldiers were serving 12-15 months in a combat zone. At the same time,
those in the Marine Corps of Air Force were only serving 6-month deployments. So, the period
was not determined during the study; rather, just the number of times they were sent to a combat
zone. Finally, those respondents with 3-7 years of service completed 1-3 deployments. Taken as
a whole, a strong majority of non-combat arms servicemembers completed just as many, if not
more, wartime deployments as those in combat arms positions. However, within the observed
sample, more than half had never been deployed. Figures 5.7 (Appendix T) and 5.8 (Appendix
U) provide the total numbers of respondents by length of service and number of deployments.
Section 5.1.3 Miscellaneous Data Points of Interest
Aside from the motivations for public service being examined, there are additional data
points collected in this study that can extend the literature among the student-veteran population.
For example, the level of education being pursued by student-veterans is of value to both
scholars and practitioners, especially the number of educational benefits available to veterans
and servicemembers. Of the student-veterans that completed the survey, only two individuals did
not respond to the question of what degree level they were pursuing. Two other individuals were
pursuing professional certifications unrelated to an official degree program. The remaining 147
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responses fell into one of three categories: associate degree, bachelor’s degree, and postbaccalaureate degree. Although there is no way of determining which college these individuals
are currently attending, the degree levels being pursued can rule out certain types of schools. For
instance, an associate degree can only be obtained at a community college. Similarly, students
can only obtain a bachelor’s degree at a four-year college or university. In this study, all noncommunity colleges have both bachelor’s and post-baccalaureate degree programs. Therefore,
those individuals pursuing an associate, are at one of the 5 community colleges that participated.
As can be seen by Figure 5.9 (Appendix V), there is a much better distribution among degree
programs than other variables and categories being observed. In short, 22% are currently
pursuing an associate degree, which can only be obtained at a community or junior college. 44%
are currently pursuing a bachelor’s degree, with the remaining 34% pursuing Post-baccalaureate
degree. The final category includes any master’s or doctoral level work, as well as professional
degrees like Law school, Athletic Training, or Accounting.
In terms of reasons for joining the military, respondents were given a series of statements
that best describe their original motivations and they could select all that apply to their specific
situations. Table 5.1 (Appendix W) provides a breakdown of the number of responses attributed
to the different reasons student-veterans had for initially joining the military.
According to the data, 79% of respondents stated that a desire to serve their country was
among their primary rationale for joining, and 54% stated that the benefits associated with
military service were desirable. Furthermore, 48% pointed to the desire to build a career doing
enjoyable work as another important characteristic. This is very important to the discussion of
institutional versus occupational motivations, as service to country reflects the institutional
(intrinsic) motivations, whereas the military benefits reflect occupational (extrinsic) motivations.
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The statement regarding a career of enjoyable work could be interpreted to encompass one or the
other, or possibly both. For instance, there is some intrinsic value to finding joy in one’s work;
however, the word “successful” can also imply extrinsic or tangible rewards for doing a good
job. In either case, almost half of the respondents viewed this as an important motivator for
joining the military.
Though a small number of respondents chose going to war as a motivating factor, it
appears to correspond to the number of individuals that served in a combat arms occupational
specialty. This is not to say that individuals from combat arms are the only ones who chose this
option. Yet, it stands to reason that people who choose a combat arms MOS desire to exercise
their duties and responsibilities, which can only occur within the context of war and conflict. It
might be more accurate to conclude that a small number of respondents chose this option
because most of their daily work occurs outside of a wartime environment. Finally, the five
individuals that chose “None of the above” merits some attention. It should be noted that the list
of options is not exhaustive and did not account for people who were looking to develop certain
skills and attributes often associated with military life (i.e., order, discipline, and structure).
The last notable data point to examine is the number of respondents who have a family
member that has also served in the military. According to Figure 5.10 (Appendix X), 85% of
respondents claimed to have at least one family member with prior service in the military. This is
significant because data within the last decade has found that fewer servicemembers have family
ties to the military. Put in a more specific context, research has found that young adults whose
parents served in the military are less likely to join the military (Pew Research Center, 2011).
However, this sample appears to contradict the overall trend since more than three-fourths of
respondents have some family connection to the military.
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Having examined important characteristics within the observed sample, the next section
will address the multiple hypotheses commensurate with the aforementioned studies regarding
the explanatory power of PSM and I-O theoretical models. I will proceed with a quantitative
examination of each hypothesis and corresponding sub-hypothesis, and then compare my results
with those published by either Ngaruiya et al. or Taylor et al. to determine what similarities or
distinctions can be gleaned from the combination of these studies.
Section 5.2 Quantitative Analysis and Results
Section 5.2.1 Comparison to Ngaruiya et al. Hypothesis 1
As previously stated, this project is comparing the results of Ngaruiya et al.’s study of
ROTC Cadets and Taylor et al.’s study of active-duty Army Special Forces soldiers to another
segment of the military population, student-veterans. To do this effectively, the same methods of
analysis had to be employed. So, this study uses both methods and then compares the results to
those found in the other studies. Despite Ngaruiya et al.’s primary focus on the relationship
between CPV and Institutional motivations in their study, they also included correlation
coefficients for all seven dimensions observed in Table 2 of their analysis (p. 448). The authors
used Cronbach’s alpha to assess the reliability of the various scales used in their study. The
lenient cutoff of .60, with .70 considered “adequate” and .80 considered “good” (Garson,
2012). was used to assess the scores of the four PSM dimensions: .773 for APS, .672 for CPV,
.731 for COM, and .781 for SS (p. 447). By comparison, Cronbach’s alpha for this study is
higher than Ngaruiya et al. in every dimension, except for CPV. Interestingly, the CPV
dimension’s alpha (.512) falls below the lenient cutoff of .60, yet such a score is still considered
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acceptable.3 Table 5.2 (Appendix Y) provides the results of the analysis when using the
calculated means for each dimension.
Based on these results, statistically significant relationships are found among the four
dimensions of PSM in a similar manner as Ngaruiya et al. found in their study. However, some
noteworthy differences are worth mentioning. First, the previous study found a positive
relationship between the CPV dimension and Institutional motivator that was statistically
significant at the .05 level, whereas the current results show a very slight positive relationship
(.029), but this is not a statistically significant relationship. Instead, the results from studentveterans show a statistically significant positive relationship between CPV and Occupational
motivators (.160*). Whereas Ngaruiya et al. found a negative relationship, results among
student-veterans show that as a person’s commitment to public values increases, so does their
extrinsic motivation for receiving the tangible benefits associated with military service. One
possible explanation for this is that individuals desire to serve their country (intrinsic motivation)
in the military - as compared to entering the public sector as a civilian - while also seeing the
tangible benefits of educational, retirement, and health benefits as appealing incentives that will
increase their opportunities during their service, as well as even after they are done serving.
Similarly, the above results show a positive relationship between attraction to public
service (APS) and both the Institutional (.163*) and Occupational (.160*) dimensions. Despite
the positive and statistically significant relationship between APS and Institutional found by
Ngaruiya et al., they reported a negative relationship between APS and Occupational orientation.
In other words, as the attraction to public service increases, the desire for tangible benefits

Cronbach’s alpha for the PSM dimensions in this study are the following: .754 for APS, .512 for CPV, .760 for
CPV, and .815 for SS.
3
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associated with military service would decrease. The distinction between these findings is
enlightening because they allude to the tangible benefits that are accessible to military veterans.
Moreover, they reinforce some of the descriptive statistics mentioned above in Table 5.1. In
short, individuals have a desire to serve their country, an attribute associated with both PSM and
Institutional motivations; yet they are also very interested in obtaining specific benefits
associated with extrinsic motivations, like educational, retirement, and health benefits. Taken
together, these results show a mix of motivations among student-veterans that allow them to
serve their country, at the same time receiving tangible benefits that can be used to aid them in
pursuing a successful career even if it is not within the military structure. In sum, using the mean
scores for each of the PSM dimensions and I-O motivations, we do find a small relationship
between CPV and Institutional motivations among student-veterans, but it is not statistically
significant, and the correlation is very minor, thus making it hard to reject the null hypothesis
that there is a positive relationship between the two variables.
Section 5.2.2 Testing Hypothesis 1: Correlation Between PSM and I-O Motivations
Taylor et al. (2015) reported the use of Pearson correlations to test their hypotheses on
the relationship between PSM dimensions and I-O motivations. Their rationale for this action is
due to the interval level of measurement associated with the factor scores developed for each of
the theoretical models. As previously stated, the research team did not use the same process for
creating these variables. Instead of generating mean scores, Taylor et al. created factor scores by
way of confirmatory factor analysis (p. 148). Since the present study has adopted the same subhypotheses, I too have used factor scores and Pearson correlation to examine the relationship
between both theoretical models. It is also worth noting that Taylor et al. included the
motivational category of monetary benefits created by Woodruff, Kelty, and Segal (2006) to
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determine if a relationship could be observed. Table 5.3 (Appendix Z) details the results and
includes the results reported by Taylor et al. for comparison.
The results in the table indicate very similar statistical relationships between the PSM
dimensions as Ngaruiya et al., though the coefficients are considerably higher across all
dimensions. Additionally, there are positive and statistically significant relationships between all
PSM dimensions and the Institutional motivation, as well as negative (but not statistically
significant) relationships to Occupational motivations. Taken as a whole, the Taylor et al. results
follow the same patterns as Ngaruiya et al., with Taylor et al.’s results being more statistically
significant. On the contrary, the results for this study do not follow the same trends as those
reported using the mean scores. Despite some consistency in the relationships between the PSM
dimensions (except for CPV, which posits a very small negative relationship), the only
statistically significant relationship is found between self-sacrifice and Institutional motivations
at the .05 level. one plausible explanation for this relationship is the level of sacrifice a
servicemember is willing to make when choosing to serve in the military and a commitment to
the values espoused by the branch of service, they serve in will enhance their willingness to
continually make certain sacrifices.
Across the model, all the coefficients are lower in the present study than those reported
by Taylor et al., with the addition of monetary motivation being insignificant in both studies. As
a result, we cannot conclude that the relationship between PSM dimensions and Institutional
motivations is meaningful among student-veterans. Again, the results from this study vary,
depending on the method used; however, neither model presents an extremely meaningful
relationship between any of PSM dimensions or I-O motivations. Rather, we can simply
conclude that aspects of each variable are present but not significantly related.
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Section 5.2.3 Hypothesis 2: Difference in Means Comparison
Ngaruiya et al. (2014) utilized an independent-samples t test to compare the results
between ROTC Cadets and undergraduate students. Despite their data not being available for use
in this study, the mean scores and standard deviations were generated from the results of the
survey and compared to their study (p. 449). For simplicity, I have included their results in Table
5.4 (Appendix AA). In short, student-veterans have higher means than both undergraduates and
ROTC Cadets in the CPV dimension, as well as the attraction to public service and compassion
dimensions. These findings support Hypothesis 2a/b. Conversely, they have a lower mean in the
Occupational motivation than both groups. In the self-sacrifice dimension and Institutional
motivation, student-veterans have a higher mean than undergraduates but a lower mean than
ROTC Cadets. A possible explanation for these scores is that ROTC Cadets were surveyed
before officially starting their military service and these motivations are likely to be higher
because they have not been tested in quite the same way as student-veterans, whose experiences
in the military might have taken a toll on their commitment to sacrifice or the institutional values
of their branch of service.
Section 5.2.4 Hypothesis 3: PSM to Predict Probability of Continuing Service in Public Sector
Hypothesis 2 and its sub-hypotheses are derived from Taylor et al.’s examination of
intent to reenlist among the active-duty Special Forces soldiers. Ngaruiya et al. conducted a
similar multinomial logistic regression, but their focus was on predicting the likelihood that a
respondent would be an ROTC Cadet. Since the current study is seeking to observe intent to
continue serving in the public sector upon completion of their intended degree program, the
regression analysis mimicked the steps taken by Taylor et al. Since the observed population of
student-veterans includes individuals that have already served out their military obligations and
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been discharged from the military altogether, intent to reenlist is not a relevant variable to assess.
On the other hand, because military service falls within the broader context of public service, it
seems reasonable to assume that their motivations for joining the military might contribute to the
career path they pursue upon completion of the intended degree program. Therefore, determining
if PSM dimensions can predict intent to work in the public sector seems a better fit for this
project.
Table 5.5 (Appendix AB) reports the logit coefficients for the first model that examines
just the PSM dimensions, while also accounting for the control variables in the study. As a
reminder, gender, MOS, race, and rank are controlled for in each model. Each variable is
dichotomized with male, non-combat arms, white, and enlisted being the reference categories
since these categories make up most respondents for this study.4 The results of this model are
similar to the results of Taylor et al.’s analysis PSM dimensions as predictors of reenlistment. In
short, they did not find a statistically significant relationship between the attraction to public
service (Hypothesis 3a) or commitment to public values (Hypothesis 3b) dimensions and their
dependent variable. Rather, they could only theorize that the “highly institutionalized context” of
the military would lead to very little variation among these variables (p. 151). Similarly, this
model does not show any significant relationships between those dimensions and intent to
continue their service in the public sector. In other words, as APS and CPV dimensions increase,
individuals are less likely to respond “No” and more likely to respond “Unsure” to seeking
employment in the public sector upon finishing their degrees. Again, neither of these
relationships were statistically significant, so we find no support for Hypotheses 3a or 3b in this
model.

4

This method mimics the one used by Taylor et al. (2015), as they created reference categories based on the
majority of their respondents (p. 149).
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When it came to SS and COM dimensions, Taylor et al. did find statistically significant
relationships. According to their model, as SS increased, respondents were less likely to be in the
“No plans to reenlist” category as compared to the “Unsure” category (p. 151). Similarly, the
results in Table 5.5 also suggest that as the self-sacrifice dimension increases, respondents were
less likely to be in the “No” category than the “Unsure” category regarding their public service
employment plans; however, this relationship was not statistically significant. So, we find no
support for Hypothesis 3c. Despite the lack of support for Hypothesis 3 up to this point, there is a
statistically significant relationship between the dependent variable and compassion analogous to
the one reported by Taylor et al. In their model, as COM increased, respondents were more like
to report “No plans to reenlist” as compared to “Unsure.” This was contrary to Hypothesis 2d,
which assumed that as compassion increased, so too would the intent to reenlist. When compared
their result, the authors deduced that individuals were motivated to reenlist out of a desire to give
of themselves rather than a genuine concern for others (p. 151).
According to the results in Table 5.5, there is indirect support for Hypothesis 3d. This
hypothesis assumes a positive relationship between compassion and desire to continue working
in the public sector, and the results under the “Yes” column support this, although it does not
show a statistically significant relationship. On the other hand, the results under the “No” column
show a statistically significant relationship between a rise in the compassion dimension and
decreased likelihood that respondents will state they have no plans to seek employment in the
public sector. Instead, they are more likely to respond “Unsure.” This cannot be taken as support
for Hypothesis 3d, but it does not completely rule out the possibility that student-veterans might
either continue serving in the military or consider another opportunity in the public sector upon
completion of their degree program. Another statistically significant relationship to point out is
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the impact of a respondent’s military occupational specialty (MOS) on their intent to work in the
public sector upon graduation. All non-combat arms specialties were coded 0 and according to
the results, individuals that in these specialties were more likely to select “Yes” on intent to work
in the public sector. It is also worth stating at this point that MOS was statistically significant in
every model generated for this study in much the same manner that rank (officer), and previous
reenlistment were significant in the Taylor et al. study (p. 152). A reasonable explanation for this
pattern, as compared to combat arms veterans, is the transferability of skills to the civilian sector.
For most individuals that served in a combat arms MOS during their time in the military, there
are very few career fields in either the public or private sector through which they can directly
transfer their skillsets. Even though the law enforcement community might have some corollary
responsibilities, this relationship is more tangential. Each branch of service has a specific police
MOS where such skillsets are regularly developed and used. Conversely, non-combat arms
positions (logistics, communications, medical services, intelligence, chaplaincy, etc.) have a
wider array of jobs and career fields in which to directly apply the knowledge, skills, and
abilities acquired during their time in service. Therefore, it is reasonable for these individuals to
seek out civilian jobs in the public sector that are commensurate to or a step above their duties in
the military.
Taylor et al. ran additional models to determine if the I-O motivations provided any
explanatory power to the reenlistment decision. When replacing the PSM dimensions with the IO motivations, they found that as Institutional motivations increased, respondents were less
likely to choose “no plans to reenlist” and this relationship was statistically significant at the .05
level. Still, there was no statistically significant relationship between institutional motivations
and choosing “yes, plan to reenlist” (p. 152). The same variables were examined in another
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model run for this study, but no statistically significant relationships were found between the I-O
motivations and plans to continue working in the public sector. Table 5.6 (Appendix AC)
provides the overall results for this model, with a positive relationship being reported between
MOS and the dependent variable.
The final model that Taylor et al. created removed Institutional motivation and replaced it
with the four PSM dimensions. This was done because of the correlation discovered between the
factors in the Pearson correlation matrix. The authors stated that the intent was to determine if
the same amount of variation found among the Institutional motivation variable could also be
explained by the PSM dimensions, especially since there was a statistically significant
relationship between Institutional motivations and the choice of “no plans to reenlist” among
their respondents. Again, the assumption was that since a correlation was found, these
dimensions could also account for the change in variation, alongside the Occupational and
Monetary motivations that were included in their second model. Instead, the new model results
were similar to findings in their first model, when neither one of the I-O nor the Monetary
motivations were included. In other words, Occupational and Monetary motivations contained no
explanatory power in the observed variation. Rather, all they concluded was that self-sacrifice
had virtually the same relationship to reenlistment plans as before, with the compassion
dimension’s relationship being downgraded to statistically significant at only the .10 level (p.
153). Table 5.7 (Appendix AD) details the results when the same model is generated with the
current dataset.
The results above appear to mimic the results found in Table 5.5 when Occupational and
Monetary motivations were excluded from the model. Again, the only statistically significant
relationship is found in the COM dimension (as compassion increases, respondents are less likely
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to answer “No” to working in the public sector). Non-combat arms respondents are more likely
to choose “Yes” to working in the public sector and neither Occupational nor Monetary
motivations have much of an effect on the outcome. These results are not surprising, primarily
because the kind of correlation between PSM and Institutional motivations found in Taylor et
al.’s model was not found in this study; yet there is a benefit to running this regression model
because it confirms previous findings and ensures some validity to the impact (or lack thereof) of
these variables of interest to the study of military personnel.
Section 5.2.5 Logistic Regression with PSM as a Single Indicator
As a point of departure from the current study, I wanted to see if PSM as collective
dimension carried any statistical significance in explaining a student-veterans intent to continue
serving in the public sector. Such an attempt is reflective of Perry’s (1996) attempt at
constructing a reliable and valid measurement tool. Despite the normative, affective, and logic
rationales for joining the public sector found within PSM theory, these factors make up the
collective sum of public service motivation. Therefore, the question of whether the individual
dimensions or the combination of them could better explain motivation for joining public
service. Table 5.8 (Appendix AE) provides the results when the four dimensions of PSM are
combined into a single factor of analysis. First and foremost, there is statistical significance
found in PSM’s explanatory power of continuing to serve in the public sector; however, it comes
in the negative form. In other words, as PSM increases among student-veterans, they are less
likely to continue serving in the public sector upon completion of their postsecondary degrees.
These results are anathema to the theory itself, as the assumption is that as PSM increases, so
will a desire to serve in the public sector. Yet, it is important to note that negative relationships
(although not statistically significant) were found in multiple dimensions of PSM in early
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regression analyses (see Table 5.5). Hence, the combination of them together would likely lead
to a negative relationship for PSM as a whole. Even though this relationship is statistically
significant relationship, this adds more credence to the argument that extrinsic motivations are
strong indicators for public service among the observed population.
Section 5.3 Concluding Points of Discussions
This chapter has provided an in-depth analysis of responses from 151 student-veterans
attending a dozen higher education institutions in several states across the country. Despite the
primary focus of observing the merits of PSM and I-O in explaining the motivational behavior of
these individuals concerning their military service, some important and worthwhile information
was collected that relates to educational and career aspirations, along with their rationale for
joining the military in the first place. Three sets of hypotheses were tested to discern whether
intrinsic or extrinsic motivations compelled them to join the Armed Forces. For the first
hypothesis, there was little correlation between the PSM dimensions and the Institutional
motivations of the I-O model. When using the mean scores of each dimension, a statistically
significant relationship between attraction to public service (APS) and Institutional motivations
was found (Table 5.2), but when generating factor scores from a CFA, the relationship was
negligible (Table 5.3). When testing the second set of hypotheses, the calculated mean scores of
commitment to public values (CPV) among student-veterans were higher than both
undergraduates and ROTC Cadets surveyed by Ngaruiya et al. As a result, we find some support
for both sub-hypotheses. It should be noted, though, that APS and COM were also higher, while
the SS dimension and Institutional motivation means fell between these two groups. Finally, the
only statistically significant relationships found in the multinomial logit regression models
related to the compassion dimension and its ability to predict behavior among student-veterans.
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In short, individuals are less likely to opt-out of continuing their public service careers when
compassion levels increase. This is significant because it fits in line with the overall findings of
PSM theory (i.e., compassion is positively correlated to military service, and public service more
generally). This also relates to the findings of Taylor et al. because they found that as
compassion increased among Special Forces soldiers, they are more likely to opt-out of
reenlistment, mainly because the nature of their work as combat arms Soldiers is less conducive
to emits compassion to others around them (p. 154).
Based on the sum of these findings, it is a stretch to say that either the normative or
affective reasons for joining originally posited by Perry and Wise (1990) were their only
motivations for answering the call to serve. At the same time, there is not an overwhelming
amount of evidence to support the notion that these individuals were simply rational actors
looking for ways to further their self-interest. Instead, there appears to be a mix of reasons
motivating military service. A sincere desire to serve one’s country is present, but so is a desire
to receive tangible benefits that will enhance their current status and their future prospects. By
comparing the present study to the findings and conclusions of Ngaruiya et al. (2014) and Taylor
et al. (2015), I have shown that PSM and I-O motivations are unable to fully explain all the
reasons people join the military. Some people are indeed motivated to join out a commitment to
preserving the values of our nation or even a moral obligation to help other people. These have
been legitimate reasons for joining and some of these motivations were present among
respondents of this study. However, one cannot definitively conclude these are the only
motivations for joining. Based on the responses in this research, there are certainly some
extrinsic motivations that entice individuals to serve in the military, whether it is for a few years
or an entire career. Over three-fourths of respondents claimed a sincere desire to serve their
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country in uniform as a primary reason for joining and every one of these individuals did so
during one of the most tumultuous periods of conflict in our nation’s history. This reality cannot
be overlooked, nor should it be understated. Many of them answered the call to serve in theaters
of war where their lives were in danger and repeatedly did so whenever the need arose. The facts
are unmistakable.
On the contrary, within the last few decades, servicemembers have been given access to
certain benefits and services that have enhanced their quality of life, as well as opened doors of
opportunity that extend beyond the military service. As evidenced by the number of individuals
using educational benefits afforded exclusively to veterans or existing servicemembers, these
tangible benefits are being utilized primarily because they were motivating factors for joining the
military in the first place. These factors might be loosely related to either the Occupational or
Monetary motivations identified by Moskos (1971) and Wood, Kelty, and Segal (2006).
However, these indicators do not fully capture all the reasons individuals may enlist in the
military. Thus, we can only surmise that people join the military for different reasons and the
military must be willing to appeal to those desires to both recruit and retain these individuals in
their ranks.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
“The true Soldier fights not because he hates what is in front of him, but because he loves what
is behind him.”
- G.K. Chesterson
Section 6.1 Conclusion of Current Research
As a theoretical model, PSM has primarily been concerned with questions about career
selection, job performance, employee retention, and the different reward structures that might
compel a person to serve in a capacity that serves the public interest. Previous studies of interest
to this project have sought to shed light on an often-overlooked segment of the public sector, the
American military. In their first approach, Ngaruiya et al. (2014) sought answers to determine
why some undergraduate students chose to use their time in college to prepare for a potential
career in the military. Their findings suggested that the PSM dimensions explained their desire to
serve the public in such a noble cause. These motivations seemed to parallel the Institutional
motivations from the I-O model. In short, these theories help explain the difference in people
who choose the military over other professions and this data was substantiated with their second
study, this time led by Taylor (2015). Both studies found strong similarities between those
currently serving and those yet to serve (i.e., ROTC Cadets). Suffice it to state, some strong
relationships between both theories and their ability to predict who is likely to serve and for long
they might serve was significant.
What the present study has tried to do is determine if the behavior is static across all
groupings of servicemembers, or if there are certain segments of the population whose
motivations might deviate from what has been previously reported. By surveying studentveterans at post-secondary institutions, this study has found that there are more reasons for
joining than just a love of country and commitment to institutional values of military service.
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There are tangible advantages that come with this line of work that extends beyond their years in
uniform, as these values are integral to the commitment that comes with joining the Armed
Forces. For instance, 84% of student-veterans surveyed in this study reported using at least one
form of the educational benefits available only to veterans. In addition, 25% stated they were
employed full-time but going to school full-time. This type of opportunity is primarily afforded
to officers in the military seeking additional education for their careers in the military. I am not
suggesting or inferring that all respondents fit into this category, but there are a limited number
of organizations, whether public or private, that are willing to pay employees their full salaries to
go to school on a full-time basis. Because of this, one cannot dismiss the extrinsic incentives that
come with military service.
Section 6.2 Limitations
Section 6.2.1 Theoretical Limitations
In the first chapter, I acknowledged that both PSM and I-O motivations have their
limitations in fully explaining or predicting the behavior of among those in the public sector.
This study has exposed some weaknesses in PSM’s ability to account for the extrinsic
motivations individuals have for joining the public sector. At the same time, the extrinsic
motivations identified in the I-O model do not fully explain these reasons either, even when
including the Monetary motivations created by Wood, Kelty, and Segal (2006). For example, the
mean score for Occupational motivations among student-veterans (2.07) was lower than both
undergraduates and ROTC Cadets in the Ngaruiya et al. (2014) study. This points to the lack of
explanation this factor has on understanding motivations for joining the military. In addition, the
second-lowest mean score among the student-veterans was monetary motivation (2.15). Hence,
these two variables are not structured or designed to properly account for the range of tangible
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motivations that an individual would have for joining the military, or by extension, continue to
serve in the public sector. A refined set of questions that better reflects the context of veterans
and servicemembers could greatly enhance attempts to predict their behavior. For instance, the
following statements are used to determine Monetary motivation:
1. Repaying my college loans was important in my decision to join the military.
2. The money for college was important in my decision to join the military.
3. An enlistment bonus was important in my decision to join the military.
These questions are valid and legitimate in determining reasons for joining but they are limited,
mainly because they do not fully account for additional monetary benefits associated with
military service, like health and retirement benefits. Both are considered monetary motivations,
especially when insurance programs through civilian jobs are generally much higher and
retirement programs require more years of service to receive full benefits. Although some of
these unexplained motivations could be accounted for under the Occupational motivations, the
questions are too vague to provide adequate explanatory power. Perhaps an individual would
choose “The need to support my family was an important decision to join the military” when
factoring in the tangible incentives of health and retirement benefits, but they could also agree
with this statement because a stable income and housing assistance were important factors in
their decision. Or individuals could have disagreed with “Financial problems were important in
my decision to join the military” because they assumed this related to massive debt and not an
unstable job market. Even though these considerations hold monetary value, they are not
properly accounted for in either the Occupational or Monetary variable. As previously shown in
Table 5.1, 54% of respondents acknowledged educational, health, and retirement benefits were
motivators in joining the military, but these factors are not controlled for in either theoretical
model.
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Another important limitation in the I-O model is the Occupational motivation’s inability
to consider the career pursuits of individuals. Multiple questions address jobs (or a lack thereof),
but there is not a statement that encapsulates career interests that can only be pursued in this
field. Put another way, individuals may want to become a fighter pilot or achieve the rank of
General. Where these aspirations would be in the service of the country, they imply several years
of service either doing a job or working their way up the rank structure. In both instances, a “lack
of available options” or “the best option” do not capture all that is motivating a person to join a
branch of service. In short, none of the statements fully capture the desire for an enjoyable career
in the military that might be equally as important to them as service to the country.
In terms of PSM’s theoretical limitations in this study, the theory did not provide a
sufficient explanation as to why student-veterans are apt to pursue careers in the military or the
public sector in general. As evidenced by Table 5.4, the mean scores for each of the four
dimensions are relatively high, as compared to respondents in the Ngaruiya et al. study.
However, we do not see the level of support for these dimensions that are found in other studies,
particularly those focusing on civilian public sector employees. Even the findings by Ngaruiya et
al. and Taylor et al. do not find statistically significant relationships between PSM and continued
service in the military. Rather, some dimensions might explain why they might leave the military
(p. 154). Similarly, this study found that compassion is a dimension that compels individuals to
leave the military but that does not necessarily mean they will choose to pursue a civilian career
in the public sector. Likewise, the findings in this study pointed to a statistically significant
relationship between attraction to public service and Moskos’ Institutional values when the mean
scores are compared, but that did not necessarily lead to much explanatory power in terms of
why these individuals might choose to continue serving or transfer over to the civil service.
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Finally, one must consider that the observed population is somewhat of an outlier since these
student-veterans can encompass a broad swath of the military. Veterans in higher education may
be there because the military was a way to go to college or they may be there to enhance their
military careers. In short, there are myriad reasons why people may go into the military and these
intentions do not always correlate with why a civilian may choose to pursue a career in the
public sector. Because PSM has primarily been a method for observing behavior among civilians
in the public sector, the tool might be skewed in such a way that it cannot capture all the factors
associated with the motivations of military service.
These limitations are not to be taken as overt criticisms of either theoretical model,
especially since they have been used in a multitude of ways to explain and predict behavior
among individuals in the public sector. The results of this study should not be taken as evidence
of their shortcomings, as its limitations will be addressed in the following section. Rather, these
limitations are merely suggestions when it comes to tailoring the content to the observed
populations. In other words, some of the language within the survey instruments used could
better reflect the context of those participating. Almost 10 years have elapsed between the data
collection by Taylor et al. and this study. Educational benefits have changed during that time, as
well as the conditions of military service. Therefore, it might be a worthwhile pursuit to reexamine some of the dimensions to determine how the nuances of the terms and phrases being
used could be modified to better reflect the current context of military service.
Section 6.2.2 Limitations of this Study
This study is primarily limited in its generalizability, mainly because of the sample size
concerning the overall population of student-veterans across the country. Despite having
respondents from both public and private institutions in multiple states, the breadth of this study
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cannot compensate for the depth needed to obtain a more accurate picture of the entire
population of student-veterans. What is more, just observing student-veterans focuses on a small
percentage of the overall population of veterans. For example, in 2017, over 650,000 veterans
were enrolled in higher education institutions (Student-veterans of America, 2017). That same
year, there were over 18 million veterans (Veterans Affairs, 2019). As a result, it is difficult to
conclude that this study is anything other than a snapshot of the overall population at a specific
moment in time. This study is unable to account for veterans that graduated with a degree in May
2021 or those who are likely to enroll in the Spring of 2022. Furthermore, the 12 participating
institutions are just a fraction of the thousands of colleges and universities at which veterans are
enrolled and the total number of respondents is much less than the total number of enrolled
veterans at just one of these institutions. For example, the total number of veterans at Pellissippi
State Community College for the 2020-2021 academic year was 332, which is more than twice
the number of student-veterans that participated in this study (Pellissippi State Community
College, 2021). This miniature sample pales in comparison to the overall population of studentveterans, so much more could be done to gain clarity on this demographic within the overall
veteran population.
In addition, this study only looked at veterans pursuing post-secondary education and
their interest in continuing to serve in the public sector. It says nothing of those individuals who
already have an education and could use it to further their public service careers, whether inside
the military’s structure or in another field of the public sector. There are also opportunities in the
public sector that do not require a post-secondary degree and this study cannot account for them
since the observed population is linked to higher education. With the dependent variable being
related to continued service in the public sector, which itself is a relatively broad category, this
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study assumes that all respondents can distinguish between what is and is not a public sector job.
Some respondents could be pursuing a degree that enables them to become a schoolteacher, but
they may not consider this employment in the public sector the same way as they would an
individual that works at the County Clerk’s office.
A third and final limitation of this study is its inability to ascertain what public service
looks like for respondents upon completion of their degrees. Intent to continue serving in the
military was accounted for in the study, as participants were asked if they intended to continue
serving in the military. However, for those who do not plan to do so but have a desire to work in
the public sector, there is no way to determine what this might look like for them. Figure 6.1
(Appendix AF) shows the responses to intent continue serving in the military upon completion of
their degrees. A strong majority of respondents have no intention of continuing to serve in the
military once they are done with their degrees, but the study itself cannot determine what public
service might look like for them in the future. Because the public sector is a wide and diverse
realm of employment, we also cannot determine if any of their military experience will be
transferrable. This level of ambiguity and uncertainty points to the need for more research on this
demographic of the American populace. Despite its inability to determine how strong of a
relationship there is between motivations of military personnel and civil servants, more could be
done beyond this study to learn how veterans can pursue careers in the public sector.
Section 6.3 Suggestions for Future Research
With the addition of the current research, a more complete understanding of motivations
among military personnel is closer to being achieved. Ngaruiya et al. (2014) assessed
motivations among ROTC Cadets (those about to join) and Taylor et al. (2015) surveyed those
currently serving. This study unlocks some insight into how those who are done serving might
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desire to continue serving the public sector. Both Public Service Motivation theory and Moskos’
Institutional-Occupational model provide important and relevant assistance in determining what
makes these types of individuals different from those serving in the civil service, as well as those
who seek entry into the private sector.
Yet, there is still more to know and learn from these unique individuals. More
information is needed to look at both enlistment and reenlistment incentives for joining the
military. Mainly because military service itself is a time-limited occupation where mandatory
retirement is regularly enforced, there is a need to ensure that the right types of individuals are
recruited into the military. As shown at the outset of this writing, recruitment levels have been
down in recent years and leaders are at a loss for how to correct this problem. Similarly, ensuring
the right incentives are provided to maintain the right individuals is an essential priority. Both
this study and Taylor et al. allude to the reality that many servicemembers have no intention of
making the military a career, so finding the right strategies to prevent the loss of talent is integral
to the success of our military. According to the findings laid out in the previous chapter,
overemphasizing certain motivational factors that appeal to a sense of duty and service to the
country may turn off those that are seeking extrinsic benefits from serving. So, ensuring the
tangible incentives of joining will appeal to people who are looking to either enhance their
quality of life or seek out opportunities that would not otherwise be afforded without military
service.
Additionally, how to entice veterans to continue serving in the public sector is a
worthwhile area of study. Public institutions at the local, state, and federal levels can attract
organized and disciplined individuals to help complete their missional objectives when they
focus on showing veterans how their knowledge, skills, and abilities can be directly applied to
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the working being done by these governments. It should also be noted that this does not have to
be just veterans who are no longer serving. Individuals that are serving in the National Guard or
Reserve components can greatly enhance the mission, vision, and values of their organization.
Conversely, the military can also take advantage of the civilian talent that has the right
characteristics to increase the quality of their ranks. One example of this is the Army Reserve’s
focus on recruiting individuals with public sector experience in overlooked areas of nationbuilding like Public Works, Telecommunications, Finance and Administration, and Education
(Litchfield, 2021). Finding professionals with proper education and experience to assist
underdeveloped countries around the world in these areas is a promising endeavor that will
require leveraging talent from multiple sectors in the civilian world. These academic pursuits
will go a long in creating more effective and efficient programs to ensure individuals with the
types of motivations to help serve those around them will be recruited, trained, and unleashed to
make a positive difference in this world.
Section 6.3.1 Generational Differences Regarding Military Service
A very important demographic of study that should be addressed in future research
regards the generational differences between those currently serving and those eligible to serve
in the coming years. Much of the literature on generational differences has addressed the
technological characteristics that have been present throughout their youth and how this affected
both their cognitive learning and social interaction. For instance, Generation X and Millennials
make up a bulk of the military, with more and more from Generation Z joining the ranks.5 The
former two groups lived during a period in which certain technological advances, like the
computer and cellular telephone were still in their infancy. However, Generation Z has grown up

5

Dimock (2019) defines Generation X as individuals born between 1965-1980, Millennials as individuals born
between 1981-1996, and Generation Z (or post-Millennials) as individuals born after 1997.
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during a time period when these were a common part of everyday life. Moreover, the former two
generations experienced life prior to the 9/11 attacks, while the latter group knows very little, if
anything, of life before the Global War on Terror (Parker and Igielnik, 2020). As a result, these
life experiences will shape their understanding of the American military and how to become an
integral part of it.
For the military branches to be successful in both recruiting and retention, they must be
able to appeal to the motivational differences found in Generation Z. This generation is assumed
to be more technologically savvy than their predecessors and these skillsets will do well to aid in
the protection of the United States from foreign adversaries in the realm of cyberspace. This type
of warfare is becoming a greater threat to national interests, both at home and abroad. Similarly,
this generation is being educated in the midst of a global pandemic and these experiences are
likely to affect their career goals and pursuits. Because the military is a social organization and
some of their learning environment is becoming less social, their understanding of the military
and the professional opportunities provided to them will be affected. If this generation is going to
answer the call to serve, they must be educated on the purpose of the military and its importance
as an institution of government, as well as the intrinsic and extrinsic opportunities provided to
them.
Section 6.4 Final Thoughts
This study set out to determine if veterans of the military were exemplary models of the
“Benevolent patriots” described by scholars like Frederickson and Hart (1985). Based on the
findings, it appears that veterans are motivated to serve for both intrinsic and extrinsic reasons.
They are willing to make significant sacrifices in the service of their country. At the same time,
they will not hesitate to take advantage of the tangible benefits associated with being a veteran.
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Some individuals are likely to be motivated by the institutional values espoused within the
various branches of the military, but some are also inclined to join because they want to pursue a
career doing something they will enjoy. In short, neither theory can fully encapsulate the myriad
reasons people will join and the military should take heed to ensure they promote both
motivational forms to ensure they can recruit the right personnel. Regardless of one’s
motivations, each generation will be called on to serve in uniform and it behooves leaders to use
appropriate techniques to appeal to both types of people.
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Appendix A: U.S. Military End Strength by Year (1938-2016)

Year

Army

Navy

Marine
Corps

1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967

418,381
530,470
714,390
2,357,174
5,143,135
11,237,985
13,690,938
14,683,894
4,441,118
2,441,253
2,315,245
2,493,561
2,212,611
4,484,869
4,973,007
4,887,135
4,510,996
4,121,687
3,985,930
3,955,676
3,696,613
3,581,809
3,522,558
3,525,312
3,875,146
975,916
973,238
969,066
1,199,784
1,442,498

119,088
125,202
160,997
284,427
640,570
1,741,750
2,981,365
3,319,586
978,203
497,773
417,535
447,901
380,739
736,596
824,265
794,440
725,720
660,695
669,925
676,071
639,942
625,661
616,987
626,223
664,212
663,897
665,969
669,985
743,322
750,224

18,356
19,432
28,345
54,359
142,613
308,523
475,604
469,925
155,679
93,053
84,988
85,965
74,279
192,620
231,967
249,219
223,868
205,170
200,780
200,861
189,495
175,571
170,621
176,909
190,962
189,683
189,777
190,213
261,716
285,269

Air
Force

Active
Duty
Totals

455,515
305,827
387,730
419,347
411,277
788,381
983,261
977,593
947,918
959,946
909,958
919,835
871,156
840,435
814,752
821,151
884,025
869,431
856,798
824,662
887,353
897,494

555,825
675,104
903,732
2,695,960
5,926,318
13,288,258
17,147,907
18,473,405
6,030,515
3,337,906
3,205,498
3,446,774
3,078,906
6,202,466
7,012,500
6,908,387
6,408,502
5,947,498
5,766,593
5,752,443
5,397,206
5,223,476
5,124,918
5,149,595
5,614,345
2,698,927
2,685,782
2,653,926
3,092,175
3,375,485

Army
Nat’l
Guard

Army
Reserve
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Navy
Reserve

Marine
Corps
Reserve

Air
Force
Nat’l
Guard

Air
Force
Reserve

Reserve
Totals

Grand
Totals

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

1,570,343
1,512,169
1,322,548
1,123,810
810,960
800,973
783,330
784,333
779,417
782,246
771,624
758,852
777,036
781,419
780,391
779,643
780,180
780,787
780,980
780,815
711,847
769,741
732,403
710,821
610,450
572,423
541,343
508,559
491,103
491,707
484,928
477,788
483,115
482,655
488,631
497,770
498,428
490,632

763,626
773,779
691,126
621,565
586,923
563,683
545,903
535,085
524,678
529,895
529,557
523,335
527,153
540,219
552,996
557,573
564,638
570,705
581,119
586,842
592,570
592,652
579,417
570,262
541,883
509,950
468,662
434,617
416,735
395,564
381,336
372,507
371,543
377,312
385,009
382,655
372,525
362,239

307,252
309,771
259,737
212,369
198,238
196,098
188,802
195,951
192,399
191,707
190,815
185,250
188,469
190,620
192,380
194,089
196,214
198,025
198,814
199,525
197,350
196,956
196,652
194,040
184,529
178,379
174,158
174,639
174,883
173,906
173,055
172,635
172,955
176,720
177,868
181,166
177,021
179,840

904,850
662,353
791,349
755,300
725,838
691,182
643,970
612,751
585,416
570,695
569,712
559,455
557,969
570,302
582,845
592,044
597,125
601,515
608,199
607,035
576,446
570,880
535,233
510,432
470,315
444,351
426,327
400,409
389,001
377,385
367,468
360,510
355,601
363,692
369,112
375,859
376,813
353,696

3,546,071
3,258,072
3,064,760
2,713,044
2,321,959
2,251,936
2,162,005
2,128,120
2,081,910
2,074,543
2,061,708
2,026,892
2,050,627
2,082,560
2,108,612
2,123,349
2,138,157
2,151,032
2,169,112
2,174,217
2,078,213
2,130,229
2,043,705
1,985,555
1,807,177
1,705,103
1,610,490
1,518,224
1,471,722
1,438,562
1,406,787
1,383,440
1,383,214
1,400,379
1,420,620
1,437,450
1,424,787
1,386,407

462,143
464,154
467,086
455,260
454,194
433,764
416,813
403,698
381,372
375,267
374,773
367,158
362,059
357,257
351,829
351,078
351,089
342,918
333,177

601,486
606,112
594,464
595,107
669,944
722,489
714,857
673,236
619,218
545,478
486,977
432,185
391,409
369,215
205,628
206,682
211,890
204,131
189,005
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237,748
244,225
248,040
252,019
270,961
296,765
302,387
317,435
280,063
262,452
238,227
218,033
202,411
191,293
87,911
87,956
88,156
82,557
76,465

88,243
87,406
81,529
82,779
95,989
106,924
111,604
108,585
103,884
101,534
99,589
99,377
99,388
100,750
39,810
39,905
41,046
39,644
39,938

114,595
115,221
116,061
117,786
117,786
119,083
117,162
113,587
109,825
110,484
110,022
108,096
105,715
106,365
108,485
112,071
108,137
106,822
106,430

153,182
159,802
153,630
167,896
177,454
203,634
204,081
188,395
164,639
154,862
151,148
144,471
143,172
139,073
73,734
76,632
74,754
75,322
75,802

1,657,399
1,676,920
1,660,810
1,670,847
1,786,328
1,882,659
1,866,904
1,804,936
1,277,629
1,174,810
1,085,963
1,002,162
942,095
906,696
867,397
874,324
875,072
851,394
820,817

3,831,616
3,755,133
3,791,039
3,714,552
3,771,883
3,689,836
3,572,007
3,415,426
2,795,853
2,646,532
2,524,525
2,408,949
2,325,535
2,289,910
2,267,776
2,294,944
2,312,522
2,276,181
2,207,224

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

507,131
522,190
544,150
553,579
566,045
565,463
550,063
532,043
508,210
491,365
491,365

349,534
336,659
331,132
328,751
327,697
324,666
318,818
324,308
326,054
327,801
327,801

180,252
186,425
198,415
203,075
202,612
201,026
198,820
195,848
187,891
183,417
183,417

348,953
333,495
327,382
333,408
334,198
333,162
332,834
330,485
316,332
311,357
311,357

1,385,870
1,378,769
1,401,079
1,418,813
1,430,552
1,424,317
1,400,535
1,382,684
1,338,487
1,313,940
1,313,940

346,288
352,707
360,351
358,391
362,015
361,561
358,078
357,735
354,072
350,023
341,589

189,975
189,882
197,024
205,297
205,281
204,803
201,166
198,209
195,438
198,552
198,395

70,499
69,933
68,136
66,508
65,006
64,792
64,715
62,443
59,254
57,359
57,980

39,489
38,557
37,523
38,510
39,222
39,772
39,544
39,501
39,450
38,906
38,517

105,658
106,254
107,679
109,196
107,676
105,685
105,389
105,708
106,380
105,728
105,887

74,075
71,146
67,565
67,986
70,119
71,321
71,428
70,913
69,784
68,494
69,364

825,984
828,479
838,278
845,888
849,319
847,934
840,320
834,509
824,378
819,062
811,732

2,211,854
2,207,248
2,239,357
2,264,701
2,279,871
2,272,251
2,240,855
2,217,193
2,162,865
2,133,002
2,125,672

This dataset is a compilation of multiple monthly and annual reports from the Department of Defense’s Defense Manpower Data
Center. Their website, www.dmdc.osd.mil contains several methods for compiling and reporting raw numbers of military and civilian
personnel within DoD. Unfortunately, this sight only records end strength for reserve components dating back to 1987; however, the
website records active-duty personnel numbers all the way back to founding of the Department of the Army in 1789. However, for the
purposes of this study, I have only included those numbers dating back to just before World War II.
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Appendix B: Table 2.1 Institutional versus Occupational Concepts (Moskos, 1986)

Institutional

Occupational

1. Legitimacy

Normative Value

Marketplace economy

2. Role commitments

Diffuse

Specific

3. Basis of
compensation

Rank and seniority

Skill level and manpower

4. Mode of
compensation

Much in noncash form or
deferred

Salary and bonuses

5. Level of
compensation

Decompressed, low recruit pay

Compressed, high recruit pay

6. Evaluation of
performance

Holistic and qualitative

Segmental and quantitative

7. Legal system

Military justice

Civilian jurisprudence

8. Reference group

“Vertical”, within organization

“Horizontal”, external to
organization

9. Societal regard

Esteem based on notion of
service

Prestige based on level of
compensation

10. Post-service status

Veteran’s benefits and
preference

Same as civilian

11. Residence

Adjacency to work and
residence locales

Separation of work and
residence locales

12. Spouse

Integrated with military
community

Removed from military
community
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Appendix C: Figure 2.1 Moskos’ Two I-O Models

Appendix D: Figure 2.2 Dimensions of I-O Model
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Appendix E: Stahl et al. (1981) Survey Questions
1. Is the institution-occupation model based upon a zero-sum concept? Does the fact that
someone scores high on the institution scale mandate that the same individual will score low on
the occupation scale or, as Janowitz' suggests, can someone be high (or low) on both?
2. Given their infantry orientation and their relative reverence for tradition, are members of the
U.S. Marine Corps more institutional and less occupational than members of the other services?
3. Are senior noncommissioned officers (E6-E9) more institutional and less occupational than
more junior enlisted personnel? (This test was suggested by Moskos during a personal
conversation. He hypothesized that senior NCOs are the most institutional of all military groups.)
4. Are senior officers (major and above) more institutional and less occupational than junior
officers?
5. Are officers with regular commissions more institutional and less occupational than officers
with reserve commissions?
6. Are physicians less institutional and more occupational than others? (When asked which
group of individuals would score lowest on the institutional scale and highest on the
occupational, the first choice of a large majority of military personnel was military physicians.)
7. Are military members possessing doctoral degrees (Ph.D., M.D., LL.D., Ed.D.) less
institutional and more occupational that non-degree holders?
8. Are military personnel who report having more civilian than military friends more
occupational and less institutional than military members who report having more military
friends?
9. What are the relationships among institution, occupation, job satisfaction, career intent,
military seniority, and perceived prestige of the military? (Moskos' definition of the institution
suggests a positive association between institution and prestige.) (1980, p. 260).
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Appendix F: Table 2.2 Public Service Motives by Perry & Wise (1990)

Appendix G: Perry & Wise (1990) Hypotheses for Public Service Motivation Theory
1. The greater an individual's public service motivation, the more likely the individual will seek
membership in a public organization.

2. In public organizations, public service motivation is positively related to individual
performance.

3. Public organizations that attract members with high levels of public service motivation are
likely to be less dependent on utilitarian incentives to manage individual performance effectively
(p. 370-371)
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Appendix H: Table 2.3 Correlate Hypotheses by Perry (1997)

Appendix I: Table 2.4 Updated PSM Dimensions by Kim et al. (2013)
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Appendix J: Table 3.1 Military End-Strength by Component
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Appendix K: Military Occupational Specialty and Officer Branch by Component
Air Force

Army

Enlisted Codes

11 – Infantry Branch

1 – Operations

12 – Corps of
Engineers12

2 – Logistics and Maintenance
3 – Support

13 – Field Artillery
14 – Air Defense Artillery

4 – Medical and Dental

15 – Aviation

5 – Chaplain and JAG

17 – Cyber Operations

6 – Finance and Acquisition

18 – Special Forces

7 – Special Investigations
8 – Special Duty Identifiers,
typically used for Airmen chosen
for specialized jobs
9 – Reporting Identifiers,
typically used for Airmen in
transit status (trainees, awaiting
retraining)

19 – Armor

56 – Chaplain
74 – Chemical,
Biological,
Radiological, and
Nuclear
79 – Recruiting and
Retention
88 – Transportation
89 – Ammunition,
Mechanical
Maintenance, and
Ordnance
91 – Mechanics and
Equipment
Maintenance
92 – Quartermaster
Corps
94 – Combat
Electronic Systems
Repair/Maintenance

25 – Signal Corps

29 – Electronic Warfare
31 – Military Police

1 – Operations

35 – Military Intelligence

02 — Intelligence

44 — Legal Services

03 — Infantry
04 — Logistics

46 — Combat Camera

05 — Marine AirGround Task Force
(MAGTF) plans

08 — Field Artillery

55 — Music
57 — Chemical,
Biological,
Radiological and
Nuclear Defense
58 — Military Police
and Corrections

09 — Training

59 — Electronics
Maintenance

11 — Utilities

60/61/62 — Aircraft
Maintenance

06 —Communications

13 — Engineer,
Construction, Facilities
and Equipment
18 — Tank and Assault
Amphibious Vehicle
21 — Ground Ordnance
Maintenance
23 — Ammunition and
Explosive Ordnance
Disposal

27 – Judge Advocate
General’s Corps

Officer Codes

Marine Corps
01 — Personnel and
Administration
43 — Public Affairs
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63/64 — Avionics
65 — Aviation
Ordnance
66 — Aviation
Logistics
68 — Meteorology and
Oceanography

2 – Logistics

36 – Financial
Management

26 — Signals
Intelligence/Ground
Electronic Warfare

3 – Support

37 – Psychological
Operations

27 — Linguist

4 – Medical

38 – Civil Affairs

5 – Professional Career Area
(Legal and Chaplain)
6 – Acquisitions and Financial
Management

42 – Adjutant General’s
Corps

28 — Ground
Electronics Maintenance
30 — Supply
Administration and
Operations
31 — Traffic
Management
33 — Food Service
34 — Financial
Management
35 — Motor Transport
41 — Marine Corps
Community Services

46 – Public Affairs
51 – Acquisition

Coast Guard

70 — Airfield Services
72 — Air Control/Air
Support/Anti-Air
Warfare/Air Traffic
Control
73 — Navigation
Officer/Enlisted Flight
Crews
80 — Miscellaneous
Requirements MOSs

Navy

AET

Avionics Electrical Technician

Enlisted

AC – Air Traffic Controllers

Enlisted

AM

Aviation Metalsmith

Enlisted

AD – Aviation Machinist’s Mates

Enlisted

AMT

Aviation Maintenance Technician

Enlisted

Enlisted

AN

Airman

Enlisted

AE – Aviation Electrician’s Mates
AG – Aerographer’s Mate (Weather and
Oceanography)

ASM

Aviation Survivalman

Enlisted

AO – Aviation Ordnancemen

Enlisted

AST

Aviation Survival Technician

Enlisted

AT – Aviation Electronics Technician

Enlisted

AVT

Avionics Technician

Enlisted

BM – Boatswain’s Mates

Enlisted

BM

Boatswains Mate

Enlisted

CE – Construction Electricians

Enlisted

BNDM

Bandmaster

Enlisted

CM – Construction Mechanics

Enlisted

DC

Damage Controlman

Enlisted

CS (SS) – Culinary Specialist

Enlisted

DP

Data Processing Technician

Enlisted

EA – Engineering Aides

Enlisted

DT

Dental Technician

Enlisted

EM – Electricians Mates

Enlisted

ENG

Naval Engineering

Enlisted

EN – Enginemen

Enlisted

FN

Fireman

Enlisted

EOD – Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Technician

Enlisted

FS

Food Service Specialist

Enlisted

FT(SS) – Fire Control Technicians

Enlisted

FT

Fire Control Technician

Enlisted

GM – Gunner’s Mates

Enlisted
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Enlisted

HS

Health Services Technician

Enlisted

HT – Hull Maintenance Technician

Enlisted

IS

Intelligence Specialist

Enlisted

IT – Information System Technician

Enlisted

IT

Information Systems Technician

Enlisted

LN – Legalmen

Enlisted

MAT

Material Maintenance

Enlisted

MA – Master at Arms

Enlisted

MK

Enlisted
Enlisted

MC – Mass Communications Specialist
MM – Machinist’s Mate, EM – Electrician’s Mate,
and ET Electronics Technician

Enlisted

MSSE

Machinery Technician
Marine Safety Specialist
Engineering

MU

Musician

Enlisted

MN – Minemen

Enlisted

OS

Operations Specialist

Enlisted

NC – Navy Counselor

Enlisted

PS

Port Security Specialist

Enlisted

ND – Navy Divers

Enlisted

PS

Port Securityman

Enlisted

PS – Personnel Specialist

Enlisted

QM

Quartermaster

Enlisted

QM – Quartermasters

Enlisted

RM

Radioman

Enlisted

SK (SS) – Storekeepers

Enlisted

SK

Storekeeper

Enlisted

SO – Special Warfare Operator (Navy SEALs)

Enlisted

ST

Sonar Technician

Enlisted

STS (SS) – Sonar Technicians

Enlisted

TC

Telecommunications Specialist

Enlisted

YN – Yeomen (Administration)

Enlisted

TT

Telephone Technician

Enlisted

YN (SS) – Yeoman (Submarine)

Enlisted

YN

Yeoman

Enlisted

Naval aviator (pilot)

Officer

Aviation

Aviation

Officer

Naval aviation (flight officer)

Officer

Comms

Communications

Officer

Naval special warfare officer (SEALS)

Officer

ENG

Engineering

Officer

Submarine officer

Officer

Finance

Finance

Officer

Surface warfare officer

Officer

HR

Human Resource

Officer

Law (JAG)

Officer

Intel

Intelligence

Officer

Public affairs

Officer

Managemt

Management

Officer

Health care

Officer

Medical

Medical

Dentistry

Officer

AVI

Aviation Engineering

Civil engineering

Officer

ELC

Naval engineering

Officer

INV

Electronics
Special Agents Criminal
Investigator

71XX - CWO Surface Warfare

Warrant Officer

ISM

Information Systems Manager

72XX - CWO Submarine Warfare

Warrant Officer

ISS

Intelligence Systems Specialist

Officer
Warrant
Officer
Warrant
Officer
Warrant
Officer
Warrant
Officer
Warrant
Officer

73XX - CWO Aviation Warfare

Warrant Officer
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Enlisted

MAT

Material Maintenance

MED

Medical Administration

OSS

Operations Systems Specialist

PERS

Personnel Administration

PSS

Port Safety and Security

WEPS

Weapons

Warrant
Officer
Warrant
Officer
Warrant
Officer
Warrant
Officer
Warrant
Officer
Warrant
Officer

75XX - CWO Staff Corps
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Warrant Officer

Appendix L: Table 4.1 Participating Educational Institutions
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Appendix M: Key Survey Questions by Dimension:
Likert-Type Scale-5 Point adapted from Kim et al. (2015)
Attraction to public service dimension (APS):
APS2: It is important to contribute to activities that tackle social problems.
APS4: It is important for me to contribute to the common good.
APS5: I am interested in helping to improve public service.
APS1: I admire people who initiate or are involved in activities to aid my community.
APS3: Meaningful public service is important to me.

Commitment to public values dimension (CPV):
CPV3: It is fundamental that the interests of future generations are taken into account when
developing public policies.
CPV5: I believe that public employees must always be aware of the legitimacy of their activities.
CPV2: It is important that citizens can rely on the continuous provision of public services.
CPV4: To act ethically is essential for public servants.
CPV1: I think equal opportunities for citizens are very important.
CPV6: I personally identify with the aim of protecting individual liberties and rights.

Compassion dimension (COM):
COM1: It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress.
COM2: I feel sympathetic to the plight of the underprivileged.
COM5: I empathize with other people who face difficulties.
COM3: I get very upset when I see other people being treated unfairly.
COM4: Considering the welfare of others is very important.

Self-sacrifice dimension (SS):
SS3: I am willing to risk personal loss to help society.
SS4: I would agree to a good plan to make a better life for the poor, even if it cost me money.
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SS2: I believe in putting civic duty before self.
SS1: I am prepared to make sacrifices for the good of society.

Institutional motivators:
c_serve: A desire to serve my country was important in my decision to join the military.
c_patriot: Patriotism was important in my decision to join the military.
c_adenture: The adventure or challenge was important in my decision to join the military.
c_veteran: The desire to be a veteran was important in my decision to join the military.

Occupational motivators:
c_noopt: A lack of better options was important in my decision to join the military.
c_jobloss: Job loss was important in my decision to join the military
c_family: The need to support my family was important in my decision to join the military.
c_bestopt: The military was the best available option to me.
c_divorce: Divorce was important in my decision to join the military.
c_finprob: Financial problems were important in my decision to join the military.

Monetary motivators:
c_loans: Repaying my college loans was important in my decision to join the military.
c_money: The money for college was important in my decision to join the military.
c_bonus: An enlistment bonus was important in my decision to join the military.

* Before each motivational indicator is the variable name used in the dataset for this study.
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Appendix N: Figure 5.1 Respondents by Gender

Appendix O: Figure 5.2 Respondents by Race
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Appendix P: Figure 5.3 Respondents by Age

Appendix Q: Respondents by Branch of Service
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Appendix R: Figure 5.5 Respondents by Component

Appendix S: Figure 5.6 Respondents by Rank
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Appendix T: Figure 5.7 Respondents by Length of Service

Appendix U: Figure 5.8 Respondents by Number of Deployments
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Appendix V: Figure 5.9 Respondents by Degree Program

Appendix W: Table 5.1 Reasons for Joining the Military
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Appendix X: Figure 5.10 Respondents with Family Members That Served
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